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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
EYEWITNESS CHOOSING BEHAVIOR: THE ROLE OF ECPHORIC EXPERIENCE 
AND NON-MEMORIAL CUES 
by 
Brian S. Cahill 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Stephen D. Charman, Major Professor 
Researchers’ attempts at understanding the processes underlying witness choosing 
behavior have focused on applying models that predict that identifications will be 
primarily driven by memorial factors. However, research has shown that several non-
memorial variables affect witness choosing behavior (e.g., administrator influence, 
clothing bias, co-witness information); thus a full understanding of the processes 
underlying witness choosing behavior needs to account for these effects. While the 
memory-based models do attempt to provide explanations for the effects of non-
memorial based variables on choosing behavior they all do so within a memorial context. 
However, I will argue a lineup task is not simply a memory task but a task that allows 
both memorial and non-memorial variables to impact choosing behavior, with the latter 
affecting choosing through an inferential process. 
The purpose of the present study was to provide an initial test of a novel, 
inferential based framework (i.e., the Competition/Corroboration Conceptualization). In 
short, this framework predicts that the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing behavior 
will occur via leading witnesses to deliberatively infer who the suspect is, and that the 
viii 
extent to which a deliberative process is engaged is dependent upon the witnesses’ 
ecphoric experience.   
Study 1 (N = 146) had mock-witnesses view several lineups with non-memorial 
cues embedded in them; results showed that mock-witnesses engaged in an inferential 
process by using the cues in the lineup to help guide their choosing behavior. Study 2 (N 
= 376) had witnesses view either a target-present or target-absent lineup where a non-
memorial cue suggested that witnesses should either identify the target, identify a specific 
filler, or was not included. Witnesses then made an identification decision. Results from 
study 2 showed that the presence of a non-memorial cue suggesting the suspect’s guilt 
increased suspect identifications compared to its absence, and importantly, that this effect 
was greater for witnesses who had a weak ecphoric experience.  
Findings across both studies suggest that an inferential based framework of 
witness choosing more fully encompasses the underlying nature of witnesses’ 
phenomenological experience. Practical implications and future directions are discussed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his seminal work, Hugo Münsterberg (1908) discussed many ways in which 
psychology and the law come in contact, be it through the detection of deception, false 
confessions, or, most relevant to this paper, eyewitness memory. Indeed, Münsterberg 
was one of the earliest proponents of applying psychological findings to solve real-world 
issues. And although he may be better known for his ideas regarding applied science, he 
also viewed theoretical understanding as an important goal within science (Münsterberg, 
1899).  Since its beginning with Münsterberg’s work to contemporary times, the goal of 
eyewitness researchers has been to empirically evaluate the factors that affect eyewitness 
memory so we may positively contribute to the legal system. And after over 100 years of 
empirical interest researchers have amassed a large corpus of research on eyewitness 
memory and decision making and have made significant contributions to the legal system 
leading to many positive changes that will ultimately lead to improved outcomes. 
However, despite the many successes, the eyewitness identification field as a whole has 
made relatively little theoretical progress in understanding the processes that underlie 
performance (Lane & Meissner, 2008). 
The Need for Theory 
If the field is flourishing with the current applied perspective why do we need to 
find a role for theory? The very phenomena that we study (i.e., eyewitness memory and 
decision making) are applied issues, and the goal of our research will always be to 
contribute our findings to the legal system. And although much of the success within the 
field is the result of directly tackling individual problems (e.g., lineup bias), there are 
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reasons why it would be a fruitful endeavor to develop more theoretically oriented 
research programs to understand the identification process.  
First, we will be better able to communicate our research findings to the legal 
community if we can provide theoretically driven explanations (Turtle, Read, Lindsay, & 
Brimacombe, 2008). That is, the substantial time and monetary cost of implementing 
policy changes combined with the legal community’s depth of training in empirical 
methodology at times makes it difficult to effectively persuade the legal community to 
adopt certain policy changes. However, a strong theoretical framework that provides a 
deeper understanding of witness choosing behavior will allow researchers to better 
communicate the reasoning behind our policy recommendations, thereby, reducing the 
skepticism of policy makers. This is of utmost importance, given the very reason why we 
study eyewitness decision making is to help improve the legal system. 
Second, one of the main criticisms of eyewitness memory research is that the 
results are not valid unless they mirror real-world conditions (Lane & Meissner, 2008). 
An excellent example of this argument was provided by Clark (2008) in his one-legged, 
six-toed Scotsman example. An expert is testifying in a case and discusses the effect of 
certain variables on eyewitness accuracy. The witness in the case is a one-legged, six-
toed Scotsman and the prosecution argues that the results of the research are not relevant 
for this witness because no one-legged, six-toed Scotsman was a participant in the 
research. Research literature will never be able to approximate every conceivable 
combination of variables that will be present in real cases. However, theoretical 
development will allow researchers to apply findings to non-studied circumstances 
(Clark, 2008).  
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Third, theoretically motivated research is much more likely to lead to greater 
progress in our understanding of the phenomenological experiences witnesses engage in 
while viewing a lineup compared to studying individual problems in a piecemeal fashion 
(Lane & Meissner, 2008). Furthermore, greater understanding of the phenomenological 
experiences will have greater impacts on practical advancements (Brewer, Weber, & 
Semmler, 2007). That is, to truly develop innovative, practical advancements that will 
lead to more diagnostic identifications we must first understand the phenomenological 
experiences that differentiate accurate from inaccurate witnesses. In sum, although our 
field has enjoyed much success thus far, theoretically motivated research is necessary to 
significantly advance our understanding of the phenomena we study and to develop the 
most impactful practical advances.  
As noted by Brewer et al. (2007), an excellent illustration of how theoretically 
driven research possesses much power in providing the most impactful practical advances 
is the development of the sequential lineup procedure (Lindsay & Wells, 1985). Few 
advancements within the eyewitness literature have enjoyed the level of impact that the 
development of the sequential lineup procedure has had. The development of this novel 
lineup procedure was driven by theoretical predictions regarding the nature of judgments 
in which witnesses engage while making an identification. Wells (1984) proposed two 
judgment strategies that eyewitnesses may engage in while viewing a lineup. That is, an 
eyewitness may compare the lineup members to each other and then choose the lineup 
member who looks most like the perpetrator (relative judgment). In comparison, an 
eyewitness may compare each lineup member to their memory of the perpetrator and 
choose the lineup member who best matches their memory of the perpetrator (absolute 
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judgment). On the basis of the aforementioned judgment strategies, Lindsay and Wells 
(1985) developed a novel lineup procedure, the sequential lineup, to reduce eyewitnesses’ 
ability to use relative judgments and thereby forcing them to use absolute judgments. The 
procedure achieves this quite simply by having witnesses view photographs of lineup 
members sequentially (one at a time) and making a decision (yes or no) before moving on 
to a new photograph. The sequential lineup procedure contrasts the historically used 
lineup procedure in which all photographs of lineup members are presented 
simultaneously and eyewitnesses are allowed to look at all pictures before making an 
identification decision. Importantly, Lindsay and Wells reasoned that if eyewitnesses 
were forced to look at the photographs in a sequential fashion they would not be able to 
engage in a relative judgment strategy. Since the Lindsay and Wells study, much research 
has shown that sequential lineups, compared to simultaneous lineups, consistently 
produce a greater reduction in false identifications from target-absent lineups compared 
to the decreased rate of correct identifications from target-present lineups (for an 
overview see Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001; for an alternative view, however, 
see Carlson, Gronlund, & Clark, 2008; McQuiston-Surrett, Malpass, & Tredoux, 2006).  
In sum, this example clearly illustrates theoretically motivated research is very effective, 
not only in generating research that will ultimately lead to a greater understanding of the 
phenomenological experiences witnesses engage in while viewing a lineup, but also in 
generating those practical advances that will contribute most to the legal system. 
Integrating Theory into the Field 
At the most basic level eyewitness researchers are ultimately interested in 
understanding why some witnesses make a lineup choice and others do not. Therefore, to 
 5 
integrate theory into the eyewitness field with any hope of success, theory must be able to 
explain the choosing behavior of eyewitnesses (Brewer et al., 2007). Specifically, theory 
must be able to account for two fundamental problems: 1) mistaken identifications of an 
innocent suspect and 2) failing to identify the perpetrator when they are present in the 
lineup. It is clear that the ultimate goal of eyewitness researchers is to 1) stop witnesses 
from choosing when the perpetrator is not in the lineup and 2) ensure that witnesses 
choose the perpetrator when he/she is in the lineup (Brewer et al., 2007). It seems there 
exist two routes for researchers to develop/integrate theory into the field to help explain 
the choosing behavior of eyewitnesses. One is to apply well developed theories from 
other, related, areas of psychology (e.g., dual-process recognition theories) to examine 
their ability to account for choosing behavior. Alternatively, a second route is to develop 
theories within the field to examine their ability to account for choosing behavior. 
Following will be a discussion of the theories researchers have used to explain witnesses’ 
choosing behavior. 
Basic Cognitive Theories 
The lineup task eyewitnesses complete is, quite simply, a recognition task. 
Indeed, in a recognition task people are typically provided with choice options (in the 
case of a lineup witnesses are given photographs) and are tasked with identifying an item 
as being one they have been exposed to previously or not (in the case of a target-present 
lineup, the perpetrator of the crime). Despite some differences between a lineup task and 
a recognition task (e.g., many recognition tasks entail a single-item response task, 
whereas lineups are a multiple-item response task), lineup tasks are essentially a test of 
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one’s recognition memory. Thus, applying theories generated by recognition memory 
researchers to a lineup situation seems appropriate.  
To date there exist several memory models (known as dual process models) that 
propose recognition memory judgments are the result of two distinct memory processes: 
recollection and familiarity (for a review see Yonelinas, 2002). Though there are several 
dual-process memory models, the core assumptions of these models are quite similar. 
Recollection based judgments are typically thought to reflect an effortful, deliberative 
process where retrieval of specific information about a study event occurs, whereas 
familiarity based judgments are typically thought to reflect a non-effortful, automatic 
process where a feeling of familiarity occurs (Atkinson, Hertmann, & Wescourt, 1974; 
Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 1994). For instance, imagine you are walking on campus and 
you see someone you recognize and you also remember where you recognize them from; 
this would be indicative of a recollection based judgment. On the other hand, if you 
recognize them but you cannot remember from where, this would be indicative of a 
familiarity based judgment. There is also general agreement that familiarity is faster than 
recollection (Atkinson, Hertmann, & Wescourt, 1974; Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 1994) 
and the two processes function independently at the time of retrieval (Jacoby, 1991; 
Tulving, 1982; Yonelinas, 1994).  
To evaluate the theoretical claims of these various dual-process models 
researchers have developed several measurement techniques to assess these two 
processes (e.g., process-dissociation procedure, receiver-operating-characteristic 
procedures, the remember/know procedure). One of the commonly used techniques to 
assess the contribution of the different types of memory (i.e., recollection, familiarity) to 
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the overall memory performance on a recognition task is the remember/know procedure 
(RK; Tulving, 1985). In the remember/know technique participants are required to 
introspect about the basis of their memory judgments and to indicate whether a given 
item was “remembered” (R) or “known” (K). Specifically, if recognition was 
accompanied by the recall of contextual details (e.g., the color of the stimulus), a (R) 
response should be made, indicating a recollective experience; however, if recognition 
was not accompanied by the recall of any contextual details, a (K) response should be 
made, indicating a familiarity experience (Tulving, 1985).  Importantly, the results 
obtained using the RK procedure reveal similar patterns as those found using other 
techniques to measure the contribution of the different types of memory (i.e., 
recollection, familiarity) to the overall memory performance, such as process-dissociation 
and receiver-operating-characteristic procedures (Yonelinas, 2001; Yonelinas, Kroll, 
Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998). That is, recognition memory judgments 
accompanied by R judgments, although slower in nature, are more accurate and made 
with greater confidence, than those accompanied by K judgments (Yonelinas, 2002).  
Given the robustness of these findings and the parallel between a recognition task 
and a lineup task, it seems plausible to expect a similar pattern of results to be revealed in 
identification decisions. To date, several researchers have successfully used dual-process 
models to account for witness choosing patterns (Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & MacLin, 
2005; Palmer, Brewer, McKinnon, & Weber, 2010). For example, researchers have 
demonstrated accurate identifications were more likely to be accompanied by R 
judgments, which parallels the findings within the cognitive literature (Palmer et al., 
2010).  
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Another approach used to account for eyewitness choosing behavior is Signal 
Detection Theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966). According to SDT, people’s ability to 
distinguish new from old stimuli is a function of two independent parameters calculated 
mathematically. One of the parameters is called discriminability which is an individual’s 
ability to correctly detect a signal (in a lineup this would be correctly identifying the 
perpetrator) vs correctly rejecting its absence (in a lineup this would be correctly 
rejecting a lineup that did not contain the perpetrator). Factors that affect the quality of 
memory (e.g., encoding time, attention, encoding conditions, etc.) influence an 
individual’s discriminability, with greater discriminability resulting from a higher quality 
memory. The second parameter is called response criterion, which refers to the amount of 
evidence needed for an individual to respond that a signal has been detected. Response 
criterion is influenced by social and/or instructional factors that bias an individual to 
respond either conservatively or liberally depending upon the social and/or instructional 
factor presented. Given that a lineup task is essentially an old/new recognition task the 
application of this theory to understanding eyewitness choosing behavior is appropriate 
and as will be discussed below has been fruitful.  
Historically, the standard lineup presentation procedure used in the legal system 
consisted of showing a witness a set of photographs simultaneously that contained one 
suspect, with the remaining photographs consisting of “known innocent” persons (a 
simultaneous lineup). While debate still exists regarding the appropriateness of the 
simultaneous lineup procedure (see Gronlund, Wixted, & Mickes, 2014; Wells, Smith, & 
Smalarz, in press), many researchers would recommend the use of an alternative lineup 
presentation procedure (i.e., a sequential lineup). The sequential lineup procedure, 
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originally introduced by Lindsay and Wells (1985), consists of sequentially showing a 
witness a set of photographs that contained one suspect, with the remaining photographs 
consisting of “known innocent” persons1. Decades of research, including several meta-
analyses (for example, Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001; Steblay, Dysart, & 
Wells, 2011) contrasting these two lineup presentation procedures has revealed the 
sequential lineup presentation yields a greater reduction in false identifications than in 
correct identifications (with this pattern commonly referred to as the sequential 
superiority effect). Furthermore, and arguably more importantly, the sequential lineup 
procedure is more diagnostic of guilt compared to the simultaneous lineup procedure 
(Steblay et al., 2011).  
Generally, two explanations have been proposed to account for the dissociated 
choosing patterns between simultaneous and sequential procedures. First, some 
researchers have argued the increase in choosing rates found in simultaneous lineups is 
the result of the type of judgment in which witnesses engage. Specifically, the 
simultaneous procedure leads witnesses to engage in a strategy that leads to more 
choosing (i.e., relative judgment strategy), while the sequential procedure, by nature, 
removes this context thereby leading witnesses to use a strategy that leads to less 
choosing (i.e., absolute judgment strategy; Lindsay & Wells, 1985). Second, others have 
explained the dissociated choosing patterns within a recognition framework. Specifically, 
the sequential procedure may result in an upward shift of a participants’ decision criterion 
(i.e., the amount of evidence required to make an identification); in other words, 
sequential lineup presentation may simply make witnesses less likely to choose overall 
(Ebbesen & Flowe, 2002). To evaluate the criterion shift explanation researchers 
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developed a novel lineup recognition paradigm which provided the necessary responses 
needed to measure participants’ decision criterion; across three studies they found 
support for the decision criterion shift explanation (Meissner et al., 2005). Specifically, 
they found that participants shown a sequential lineup responded more conservatively 
(i.e., they were less likely to choose) compared to those shown a simultaneous lineup. 
Thus, SDT has provided a theoretical account of the dissociation of choosing patterns 
found between simultaneous and sequential lineups. Thus far, we have focused solely on 
the application of basic recognition models to account for eyewitness choosing behavior. 
Next, a model that was designed specifically to account for eyewitness choosing behavior 
will be discussed (i.e., the WITNESS model). 
WITNESS Model of Eyewitness Choosing Behavior 
Although many researchers initially attempted to account for witness choosing 
behavior using dual-process recognition models, some have attempted to develop area-
specific models. Clark (2003) developed a mathematical model called WITNESS which 
has successfully accounted for witness choosing behavior. As previously mentioned, 
much research suggests witnesses engage in either a relative or absolute judgment 
strategy (or some combination of both) to make an identification decision. With this 
theoretical framework in mind, the model assumes witnesses make lineup decisions by 
matching each lineup alternative to their memory of the culprit; the decision whether to 
make an identification or not is then determined by a weighted combination of relative 
and absolute match information. Specifically, match values associated with the lineup 
members (roughly, their similarity to the witness’s memory of the criminal) are 
calculated by a witness and then these match values are applied to a decision rule (i.e., 
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the witness’s decision criterion). For each lineup member the witness will match various 
features of a lineup member (e.g., facial structure, hair and eye color, facial hair, height, 
etc.) to their memory of those features possessed by the perpetrator and then weight the 
importance of each feature in determining the level of match between the lineup member 
and their memory of the perpetrator.  For example, a witness using a decision rule based 
on a 100% weighting of absolute judgment match information will identify the lineup 
member who is the best match to the memory of the perpetrator if that lineup member’s 
match value exceeds the witness’s decision criterion. Alternatively, a witness using a 
decision rule based on a 100% weighting of relative judgment information will identify a 
lineup member if the difference between the lineup member with the highest match value 
and the lineup member with the next highest match value exceeds the witness’s decision 
criterion. Importantly, the best match may be the result of either an absolute judgment 
(e.g., the best match is identified because they are a very good match to memory) or a 
relative judgment (e.g., the best match is identified because they are a much better match 
than anyone else in the lineup) or some combination thereof. Although there is less 
research evaluating the effectiveness of the WITNESS model in accounting for 
eyewitness choosing behavior compared to the aforementioned dual-process recognition 
models it nonetheless has been shown to reliably account for a variety of eyewitness 
choosing patterns (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004; Clark, 2003; Clark, Marshall, & 
Rosenthal, 2009; Goodsell, Gronlund, & Scott, 2010).  
Thus far I have discussed three theoretical approaches that have proven fruitful in 
accounting for various patterns of eyewitness choosing behavior. As a result these 
approaches have given researchers insights into the decision-making processes witnesses 
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engage in while making a lineup decision. Although the aforementioned approaches 
differ in some respects, they share an underlying theme from which their predictions of 
eyewitness choosing behavior stem. Namely, a lineup task is predominately a memory 
task, and thus, an eyewitnesses’ decision to choose or not choose a lineup member can be 
accounted for by the amount of match (or lack thereof) a lineup member has to the 
eyewitnesses’ memory of the perpetrator and that witness’s decision criterion. In other 
words, these approaches, for the most part, would predict non-memorial based variables 
would have little to no effect on choosing behavior, except insofar as they either (a) affect 
the witness’s decision criterion, or (b) result in a re-assessment of the lineup members’ 
similarity to the perpetrator. However, I will argue a lineup task is not simply a memory 
task, but is rather a memory task that occurs within a social context that allows non-
memorial variables to impact choosing behavior through an inferential process that 
cannot be accounted for with a decision criterion shift or a re-assessment of the lineup 
members’ similarity to the perpetrator. This is not to say that memory is not the driving 
force underlying the phenomenological experience of the eyewitnesses’ decision making. 
Rather, because of the nature of a lineup task, witnesses are inherently motivated to make 
an identification, leading them to look for non-memorial cues in an attempt to determine 
who the perpetrator is. Thus, it is important to develop and test theoretical approaches 
that are able to take into account these non-memorial variables and their effect on 
eyewitnesses’ decision making. 
Motivation and Social Influence in a Lineup Task 
The eyewitness and/or victim, the police, and the prosecutor are all motivated, 
albeit to varying degrees, to obtain a positive identification of the suspect. An 
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eyewitness’s and/or victim’s motivation to make a positive identification of the suspect 
may stem from their wanting to feel good about their memory, that they are a good 
member of society because they helped the police, and, in the victim eyewitness case they 
can feel a sense of closure/justice. Furthermore, the police and prosecutors may be 
motivated to selectively seek out information that confirms their pre-existing hypotheses 
(i.g., confirmation bias; Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013) to prove they are competent 
within their profession and/or to obtain justice for the victim.  
This is not to say the motivation of the aforementioned parties is to simply get an 
identification of a suspect, regardless of guilt. However, in a criminal investigation, if an 
eyewitness is being shown a lineup it is because there is some suspicion on behalf of the 
investigators that the suspect is the perpetrator. This makes sense from both the 
witnesses’ and an investigator’s perspective. Witnesses may assume that if the police ask 
them to look at a lineup it is implied the police have a suspect; why else would they be 
asked to look at a lineup? Indeed, Memon, Gabbert, and Hope (2004) showed that over 
90% of participants across several identification experiments reported they assumed the 
perpetrator was in the lineup despite being provided with unbiased instructions. This 
assumption should result in witnesses being motivated to make a lineup identification. In 
sum, because of the specific nature of a lineup task the parties involved are all likely 
motivated, to some extent, to obtain an identification of the suspect.  
The argument that a lineup task is more than simply an amotivational memory 
task, but rather is one that involves motivated witnesses, is not new (e.g., Wells & Luus, 
1990). Recently, there have been calls for the development of new lineup procedures 
(Brewer & Wells, 2011) and the development of theoretical frameworks that take into 
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account the influence of social variables on choosing behavior (Brewer et al., 2007; 
Charman & Wells, 2007a). The proposed studies are designed to test a theoretical 
account of witness choosing behavior that incorporates a non-memorial based inferential 
process into witnesses’ identification decisions. 
Non-memorial influences in a lineup context 
Multiple findings within the eyewitness area suggest that witnesses’ decisions are 
partly based on motivational – as opposed to strictly memorial – factors. Wells and Luus 
(1990) drew an analogy between a methodologically sound experiment and a lineup task.  
That is, like participants in an experiment, eyewitnesses’ behavior during a lineup task 
may be guided by experimenter bias and/or demand characteristics if preventative steps 
are not taken (e.g., the use of a double-blind procedure). A large body of research shows 
experimenters may communicate either directly or indirectly their expectations to 
participants through their interaction with participants, termed Experimenter Expectancy 
Effects, and as such participants will allow these expectations to influence their behavior 
(Rosenthal, 1966).  
Furthermore, when participants (or eyewitnesses) have preconceived ideas of the 
desired outcome, this awareness may affect their behavior during the experiment (or 
lineup task). These demand characteristics are likely to be present during a lineup task, 
given eyewitnesses’ expectation that the perpetrator is in the lineup. Again, much 
research has found evidence of the effect demand characteristics have on participant’s 
behavior (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).  
This analogy prompted Wells and Luus (1990) to propose a set of 
recommendations for conducting a lineup. For instance, to reduce the effect of 
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experimenter bias, they suggested that lineups should be administered by someone who is 
blind as to who the suspect in the lineup is (i.e., double-blind procedure). As expected, 
findings within the eyewitness literature support the need for the use of a double-blind 
procedure. Specifically, results across multiple studies indicate that witness are more 
likely to choose from a lineup when the administrator had more contact with the 
eyewitness (Haw & Fisher, 2004) or when the administrator was not blind (Greathouse & 
Kovera, 2009; Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999; Rhead, Rodriguez, 
Korobeynikov, Yip, & Kovera, 2015). Also, witnesses – especially those with weaker 
memories – appear to look for indications from the lineup administrator as to the identity 
of the suspect in the lineup when they are motivated to make an identification 
(Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). These findings suggest that witnesses’ decisions are partly 
being driven by non-memorial factors and importantly that the extent to which the non-
memorial factors affect choosing behavior is dependent upon witnesses’ ecphoric 
experience (i.e., the perceived sense of similarity between a stimulus and a person’s 
memory (Tulving, 1981). 
Another example of social influence on eyewitness choosing behavior is that of 
criminal face bias (Flowe & Humphries, 2011; McQuiston & Malpass, 2002), which is 
the tendency of eyewitnesses to select the most criminal-looking person from a lineup. 
Recently, Flowe and Humphries (2011) demonstrated this effect using a randomly 
obtained sample of real police lineups. Results showed that participants who did not 
receive a description of the suspect were biased toward choosing the most criminal-
looking faces. Furthermore, when asked to justify their lineup choices participants 
indicated they chose the person because they looked like a criminal. Perhaps most 
 16 
interestingly, this bias had more of an effect on participants who had no other information 
available to them. This finding provides some initial support that is directly relevant to 
the current paper. First, as with administrator influence, it shows that eyewitnesses’ 
choosing behavior is affected by non-memorial cues. And, second, it provides a 
foundation that the effect of these non-memorial cues may be moderated by the ecphoric 
experience of the eyewitness. 
Research investigating eyewitness confidence also provides evidence supporting 
the idea that (1) social influences do impact witnesses’ decision making, and (2) these 
influences are moderated by the ecphoric experience of the eyewitness. A reliable finding 
within the literature is that confirming post-identification feedback from the administrator 
(i.e., “Good you identified the suspect”) inflates witnesses’ retrospective confidence in 
their identification decision (Wells & Bradfield, 1998; see meta-analysis by Steblay, 
Wells, & Douglass, 2014). Furthermore, research has shown that the confirming feedback 
effect is stronger for witnesses who are inaccurate (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002; 
Charman & Wells, 2012). Thus, these findings support the idea that witnesses do use 
non-memorial cues to guide them in their decision-making, and importantly, the effect of 
these non-memorial cues is greater when witnesses have a weak ecphoric experience 
compared to a strong ecphoric experience.  
Thus far, I have established several important points. First, there exists a strong 
motivational component in a lineup task. Second, this motivation and the presence of 
social influence leads eyewitnesses to not simply rely on the memorial processes alone 
while making an identification decision but also non-memorial cues that are present in 
the lineup. Third, the effect of these non-memorial cues on choosing behavior may be 
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moderated by the ecphoric experience of the eyewitness. An important question remains: 
Can the existing theoretical frameworks account for these data?  
Again, the three theoretical frameworks (dual-recognition models, SDT, and the 
WITNESS model) that have been used to account for choosing behavior thus far are 
based on the idea that a lineup task is predominately a memory task; these approaches 
postulate that the effect of witnesses’ motivation and/or non-memorial cues on choosing 
behavior would be changing their decision criterion (i.e., the amount of memorial match 
needed to make an identification). According to the criterion shift explanation the 
presence of a non-memorial cue should result in a specific pattern of data, that is, it 
should lower a witness’s decision criterion thereby increasing choosing rates independent 
of the witness’s ecphoric experience.  
However, Clark et al. (2009) showed a different pattern of data inconsistent with a 
criterion shift explanation. They were investigating the effect of administrator influence 
on eyewitness identification decisions. The two influence conditions consisted of either 
providing cautionary statements (e.g., “take your time”; subtle-influence condition) or 
asked the witness directly to consider the most-similar lineup member (similarity-
influence condition). Interestingly, they found that witnesses in the subtle-influence 
condition were more likely to choose, but only for witnesses who viewed target-absent 
lineups, resulting in increased false identifications but not increased correct 
identifications. And most important to the current point, the subtle influence 
manipulation changed the distribution of choices in the target-absent condition. This 
latter pattern of data cannot be accounted for by the criterion shift explanation. For 
example, imagine a lineup in which lineup member 5 is the best memorial match. 
 18 
Decreasing a witness’s decision criterion should certainly result in a higher identification 
rate; however, the overall distribution of choices would be the same. That is, because 
lineup member 5 is the best memorial match he would be picked at a higher rate 
compared to the other lineup members regardless of the witness’s decision criterion. The 
effects of a manipulation that changes not only the overall choosing rate, but also the 
distribution of choices, cannot be explained via a simple change in decision criterion. As 
stated by Clark et al. (2009), changing the decision criterion can determine whether the 
best memorial match will be selected, but it cannot determine who the best match is.   
Other data are also inconsistent with the criterion shift explanation. A criterion 
shift explanation predicts that a lowering of witnesses’ decision criteria will result in 
increased choosing in both target-present and target-absent lineups; however, numerous 
findings have failed to produce this pattern of results. For instance, although most studies 
investigating the effect of biased/unbiased instructions show increases in both correct and 
false identification rates, some have only shown an increase in false identifications (e.g., 
Cutler & Penrod, 1988; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Malpass & Devine, 1981). 
Also, a similar pattern has been shown when eyewitnesses are given instructions 
regarding the possible appearance change of the suspect (Charman & Wells, 2007b).  
Clearly, there exists data that the criterion shift explanation has a difficult time 
accounting for, but what about the WITNESS model? To account for his data that subtle-
influence changed the distribution of choices, Clark et al. (2009) proposed that instead of 
the match values being an unchanging static variable witnesses will update the match 
values when a non-memorial cue is present. The reassessment of match values 
explanation predicts the presence of a non-memorial cue may lead witnesses to re-weight 
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the importance of certain features which would either lower (or raise) lineup members’ 
match values, and importantly, change which lineup member is now the best match. To 
date, this modification to the WITNESS model has not been empirically tested. 
A Novel Model of Eyewitness Choosing Behavior 
Charman and Wells (2007a) proposed a model developed specifically to account 
for eyewitness choosing behavior. Their model, the Competition/Corroboration 
Conceptualization (CCC), is based in part from Logan’s (1988) instance theory. In brief, 
instance theory attempts to account for the development of automatic processes of any 
given stimulus. According to the theory, when first presented with a stimulus one begins 
by slowly responding in a deliberative algorithmic way to the stimulus, but with 
increased exposure to the stimulus one accumulates memories, or instances, of interacting 
with the stimulus. As such, at a certain point one stops responding to the stimulus using 
slow, deliberative algorithmic responses and instead responds to the stimulus based off of 
an accumulation of instances regarding responses to the stimulus. Importantly, deliberate 
and automatic processes do not operate in isolation but rather operate in parallel fashion, 
with the two processes racing and the one that finishes the race first controlling the 
outcome. Accordingly, as instances of the stimulus accumulate over time the response is 
more likely to be driven by memory-based processes than by the algorithmic-based 
processes. Of note, for the purpose of CCC, algorithmic- and memory-based responses 
are analogous to inferential and ecphoric processes, respectively.  
On the basis of this framework, the CCC states that witnesses will have an 
ecphoric experience (i.e., recognition) and will also engage in inferential (i.e., reasoning) 
processes when looking at a lineup, and that there exists a trade-off between the two. For 
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example, imagine a situation in which you were sitting next to a man at the bus stop for 
30 minutes and then gets up and robs a young woman who was approaching the bus stop. 
If the police showed you a lineup containing a picture of this individual taken soon after 
the crime and five fillers you would likely immediately recognize the perpetrator and 
correctly identify him. Because your memory was strong and a recent picture was 
included in the lineup you were likely to have had a strong ecphoric experience and 
therefore would not have to try and reason (i.e., engage in inferential processing) which 
lineup member was the thief. However, imagine the same situation except the police put 
an innocent man in the lineup. Now when you look at the lineup you have a weak 
ecphoric experience but because you are motivated to make an identification you begin 
using non-memorial cues present in the lineup (e.g., only one member is wearing the 
same color jacket the thief was wearing) to infer which lineup member is the perpetrator. 
To the extent that witnesses have a strong ecphoric experience, they will engage 
in fewer inferential processes; to the extent that witnesses have a weak ecphoric 
experience, they will engage in more inferential processes. Choosing and identification 
confidence are both partly a function of whether the two processes – ecphoric experience 
and inferential  – cooperate (i.e., lead to the same lineup member) or compete (i.e., lead 
to different lineup members) with each other. Thus, two main points arise from this 
conceptualization: Non-memorial cues can influence choosing (as they can lead witnesses 
to infer who the suspect is in a lineup), and the magnitude of the influence of those non-
memorial cues is inversely proportional to the strength of the witnesses’ ecphoric 
experience. 
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The tradeoff between the witnesses’ ecphoric experience (i.e., recognition) and 
inferential (i.e., reasoning) processing proposed by the CCC reflects a framework that 
several social and cognitive psychological theories propose. For instance, the outshining 
hypothesis (Smith, 1988) predicts that the effectiveness of environmental context cues 
will be dependent upon the presence (or absence) of better cues. In other words, when a 
person’s memory is weak they will use external cues to aid in their task. However, when 
a person’s memory is strong they will not seek external cues to aid in their task. Indeed, 
research shows that context reinstatement leads to better memory when a free recall task 
is given (a situation where the memorial task is more difficult because of the absence of 
cues), but does not affect memory performance when a recognition task is given (a 
situation where the memorial task is easier because of the presence of cues; e.g., Godden 
& Baddeley, 1975, 1980; Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978). Another example of this 
general framework is Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory which proposes that 
individuals will not seek out external comparisons to aid in their self-evaluations if their 
own internal standards are strong. Thus, in general the extent to which external influences 
impact peoples memory, self-perceptions, and/or other behavioral phenomenon seem to 
be inversely related to the strength of the available internal influences.   
Although the CCC and Instance Theory share much of the same underlying 
framework, the CCC differs in some respects due mainly with its application to a lineup 
task. Whereas Instance Theory states automaticity is reached through the accruing of 
repeated interaction with a stimulus, the CCC states an ecphoric experience may develop 
through any processes that increases memory quality (e.g., increased exposure duration, 
quality of view, degree of attention allocated, etc.). Next, the strength of the ecphoric 
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experience is dependent upon the quality of the witnesses’ memory and the extent to 
which the witnesses’ memorial representation of the perpetrator closely matches the 
perpetrator’s physical appearance in the lineup. In other words, strength of the ecphoric 
experience is dependent upon the level of ecphoric similarity between the witnesses’ 
memory and the perpetrator’s appearance in the lineup. As this match weakens, either 
because of a poor memory or because the perpetrator is not in the lineup, so will the 
ecphoric experience. Lastly, according to the CCC, if the witness has a strong ecphoric 
experience it will always win; however, inferential processes still occur before any 
decision is made. To clarify, within this framework, an inferential process is when a 
witness tries to ascertain who the suspect is. Thus, the CCC proposes that regardless of 
the strength of the witnesses’ ecphoric experience, witnesses’ will usually engage in 
inferential processes which will either support (corroborate) or cast doubt (compete) 
about the veracity of the ecphoric response. Next I will discuss evidence within the 
literature that shows witnesses choosing behavior is driven by both the ecphoric 
experience and inferential processing. 
Research investigating various postdictors of eyewitness accuracy (i.e., variables 
collected during or after the identification itself that are related to a witness’s accuracy) 
suggest that quick, automatic responses are related to correct identifications whereas 
slow, deliberative responses are related to false identifications (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 
2007).  Four specific postdictors have been discovered. First, accurate identifications tend 
to be associated with higher confidence (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). Second, 
decision time has been consistently shown to be negatively associated with accuracy 
(Smith, Lindsay, & Pryke, 2000; Sporer, 1992, 1994), such that witnesses who take a 
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long time to make an identification (presumably because they are using inferential 
processing) tend to be less accurate than those who come to a quick decision (presumably 
because they have a strong ecphoric experience). Third, witnesses who report having had 
an automatic recognition experience (i.e., strong ecphoric experience) during the lineup 
identification task are more likely to make accurate identifications than witnesses who 
report having engaged in more deliberative, process-of-elimination judgments (i.e., 
inferential processing; Dunning & Stern, 1994; Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Smith et al., 
2000). Lastly, accurate witnesses (i.e., those who tended to have had a strong ecphoric 
experience) tend to remember fewer fillers than inaccurate witnesses, presumably 
because they were less likely to encode the fillers’ faces (Charman & Cahill, 2012). 
These findings likely all stem from a common underlying process: when a witness has a 
strong ecphoric experience it indicates they have likely seen that person before, thus 
suggesting the lineup member is the perpetrator. On the other hand, a weak ecphoric 
experience leads a witness to engage in inferential processing, and is thus likely to result 
in an inaccurate identification. Note that this is consistent with the CCC’s prediction of a 
trade-off between ecphoric experience and inferential processes: Witnesses with a weak 
ecphoric experience engage in subsequent inferential processes, which can lead to false 
identifications. 
Based upon the above data it seems clear eyewitnesses (1) engage in inferential 
processing and (2) the extent to which witnesses engage in inferential processing is 
dependent upon the strength of their ecphoric experience. Furthermore, this line of 
research also provides support that eyewitnesses are motivated to make a decision and if 
that decision does not come easy (i.e., strong ecphoric experience) they will engage in 
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inferential processing in search of evidence (both memorial and non-memorial) for which 
lineup member they should identify.  
The CCC is quite capable of explaining much of the existing data, including the 
findings suggesting a trade-off between the ecphoric experience and inferential 
processing: the fact that non-memorial cues affect choosing behavior (e.g., administrator 
influence; Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Phillips et al., 1999), that the effect of non-
memorial cues is greater when they have no other information to rely on (e.g., criminal-
face bias; Flowe & Humphries, 2011), and data showing that certain cues can change the 
distribution of choices (e.g., administrator influence; Clark et al., 2009). In sum, by 
postulating that witnesses may engage in inferential processes, the CCC can account for 
the motivational component of a lineup task.  
Thus far I have presented three theoretical explanations that may possibly account 
for the effect of non-memorial cues on witness choosing behavior. Each explanation 
makes a different prediction about how a non-memorial cue will affect witness choosing 
behavior. First, a criterion shift explanation would predict that the presence of a non-
memorial cue will lower witnesses’ decision criterion resulting in increased choosing 
regardless of witnesses’ ecphoric experience. Second, the reassessment of match values 
explanation would predict that any effect of the presence of a non-memorial cue on 
witness choosing will be mediated by a change in perceived similarity. Third, the 
inferential based framework will predict that the presence of a non-memorial cue will 
affect choosing rates independently of a change in perceived similarity.  
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Present Study 
The purpose of the present study was to provide an initial test of the inferential 
based framework proposed by the CCC. First, in Study 1, I examined whether mock 
witnesses – who lack a memory of a perpetrator – nonetheless use non-memorial based 
cues to infer the identity of the suspect in a lineup; this will also allow me to determine 
the most effective non-memorial cue to use in Study 2. Second, in Study 2, the primary 
goal was to examine the backbone of the CCC, by examining whether the effect of non-
memorial cues (which require inferential processing) is moderated by the strength of the 
witnesses’ ecphoric experience. An additional goal was to test the three theoretical 
explanations (i.e., criterion shift, reassessment of match values, and inferential based 
explanation) that attempt to account for the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing 
behavior. Specific hypotheses and the rationale supporting each prediction will be further 
outlined for each Study. 
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II. STUDY 1 
Given the importance of this manipulation and the relative scarcity of past 
research examining this specific manipulation, the goal of Study 1 was to test whether 
non-memorial cues affect mock witnesses’ choosing behavior. To provide a test of the 
CCC it was necessary to use non-memorial cues that would affect choosing rates without 
affecting the memorial experience of the witness. For example, having only one of the 
lineup members wearing similar clothing to that of the perpetrator could be used as a cue 
to affect witnesses’ choosing behavior. However, in this case the memory-based models 
could account for this effect via an increase in familiarity: Perhaps the similarity of 
clothing worn by the suspect produces a sense of familiarity in the witness, thus allowing 
memory-based theories to account for these data. Thus, the cues used in Study 1 were 
deliberately chosen because they are assumed to affect choosing yet are unlikely to do so 
by increasing familiarity.  
Because the CCC predicts these cues will be most effective when the witnesses’ 
ecphoric experience is weak compared to when it is strong, Study 1 used a mock-witness 
paradigm. Doob and Kirshenbaum (1973) proposed the mock-witness paradigm to 
evaluate the extent to which the suspect in the lineup stands out compared to the other 
lineup members (i.e., lineup bias). In contrast to a real witness, a mock-witness has no 
memory of the perpetrator but is still asked to view a lineup and to identify the person 
who they think is the suspect. To aid the mock-witnesses’ decision, they are given a 
verbal description provided by the actual witness. If the lineup is fair then the mock-
witnesses’ identifications should be evenly distributed amongst the lineup members, 
whereas if a lineup is biased against the suspect the suspect will be identified at a rate 
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above chance. I hypothesized that the presence of a cue on a lineup member will lead to 
increased choosing of that lineup member compared to the absence of a cue. Because the 
mock witnesses by definition lack a memory of the perpetrator, such a finding could only 
be accounted for if mock witnesses used the cue infer who the suspect is.   
Method 
Participants and Design. One hundred forty-six undergraduate students (68% 
female; 65% Hispanic; Mage = 22, SD = 3) from a large southeastern university 
participated in exchange for extra credit in their psychology courses. This research was 
fully approved to meet all ethical standards of treatment by an institutional review board 
(IRB). One group of participants (n = 73) were shown 8 lineups, five of which had a non-
memorial cue on a randomly selected lineup member, while 3 lineups were distractors 
with no non-memorial cue present. A separate group of participants (n = 73) were shown 
the same 5 cued lineups except there were no non-memorial cues present.  
Materials 
Non-memorial cue stimuli. For this study I developed 5 non-memorial cues to 
assess. In essence the goal of a non-memorial cue in the lineup is to provide the witness 
with a cue that they could use to help guide their choosing behavior without affecting 
familiarity. The cues that were tested were: 1) One of the photographs had a different 
color background compared to the other photographs in the lineup which all had white 
backgrounds, 2) One of the photographs had a mug shot like background whereas the 
other photographs in the lineup had no backgrounds, 3) One of the photographs had a 
circle around its number whereas the other photographs in the lineup did not, 4) One of 
the photographs was slightly larger in size compared to the other photographs in the 
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lineup, and 5) One of the photographs was tilted at an angle whereas the other lineup 
photographs were not. 
Lineup construction. All lineups were constructed using a digital database of 
student identification photographs. Of the five critical lineups (those both groups were 
exposed to either containing the cue or not), two consisted of Hispanic Females, one of 
Hispanic Males, one of Caucasian Females, and one of Caucasian Males. Of the three 
distractor lineups (that were only shown to half of the participants), one consisted of 
Hispanic Females, one of Hispanic Males, and one of African American Females. For 
each lineup a mock suspect was first selected then fillers were chosen based on the 
similarity to that mock suspect. Lineups were shown simultaneously on a computer 
screen in full color in a 3 x 2 array consisting of head-and-shoulder views, wearing 
everyday clothing in a full-frontal view. 
Procedure  
Lineups were shown to two separate psychology classes at the beginning of the 
class. Participants were instructed that they would view a series of lineups and that for 
each lineup they were to choose the lineup member who best fit the description provided 
to them. Of note, none of the non-memorial cues manipulated affected or were related to 
this description. At the top of each lineup a vague description was provided consisting of 
ethnicity, gender, and hair and eye color. All participants’ responses were recorded 
before moving to the next lineup and they were kept blind as to the number of lineups 
they would view. For the group that saw the lineups with the non-memorial cues 
embedded in five of them, there was an additional three lineups (distractor lineups) with 
no additional cues embedded to prevent the participants from deducing the purpose of the 
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study. Only those in the non-memorial cue condition were shown these distractor lineups. 
Once all data was recorded the participants were thanked for their time and given extra 
credit. 
Results and Discussion 
To examine the effect of the non-memorial cues on choosing I compared the rate 
at which the cued lineup member was chosen when the cue was present (cue condition) 
compared to when it was absent (control condition). Only two cues significantly 
increased choosing rates of the cued member. First, when the lineup member’s number 
was circled he was chosen at a significantly higher rate (56.2%) compared to when the 
cue was absent (34.2%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 7.08, p = .008, φ2 = .05. Second, when the 
lineup member had a mugshot like background she was chosen at a significantly higher 
rate (37.0%) compared to when the cue was absent (13.7%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 10.46, p = 
.001, φ2 = .07.  
The remaining three cues did not affect choosing rates. First, when the lineup 
member’s photograph had a different colored background he was chosen at a similar rate 
(63.0%) compared to when his background was not different (43.9%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 
2.78, p = .09, φ2 = .02. Second, when the lineup member’s photograph was enlarged she 
was chosen at a similar rate (9.6%) compared to when her photograph was the same size 
as the other members (16.4%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 1.51, p = .22, φ2 = .01. Third, when the 
lineup member’s photograph was tilted he was chosen at a similar rate (13.7%) compared 
to when his photograph was not tilted (9.6%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 0.59, p = .44, φ2 = .004. 
Based upon these results it was established that both the presence of a circle on a 
lineup member’s number and a mugshot-like background significantly increased 
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choosing rates of those lineup members compared to the absence of the cue. Thus, I 
showed that mock witnesses use non-memorial cues to infer the identity of the suspect in 
a lineup. However, it should be noted that this study does not provide any evidence as to 
the predictions made by the CCC because this study used mock-witnesses who by 
definition have no memory of the crime and who are forced to choose. On one hand, it is 
not all that surprising that under these contrived conditions they used the presence of a 
cue to aid in their lineup choice. On the other hand, the fact that not every cue we tested 
affected choosing rates indicates that not all cues have comparable effects. It may be that 
the cues that did not affect choosing (i.e., different color, enlarged, and tilted) did not 
allow the mock witnesses to infer who the suspect was. In contrast, the circle and 
mugshot-like background may have allowed the mock witnesses to infer the identity of 
the suspect. For example, the mock witnesses might have inferred the circle in the lineup 
implied that another witness already identified this person, thus implying that lineup 
member was the suspect. Importantly, because mock-witnesses have no memory of the 
perpetrator any effect of the cue on choosing rates must have been the result of an 
inferential process. However, these results cannot tell us how these cues will affect real 
witnesses who have an actual memory of the perpetrator. Thus, the purpose of Study 2 
was to examine the effect of non-memorial cues on real witnesses. 
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III. STUDY 2 
As previously stated, the purpose of this study was to examine whether the effect 
of non-memorial cues (which require inferential processing) on witness choosing 
behavior is moderated by the strength of the witnesses’ ecphoric experience. The strength 
of the witnesses’ ecphoric experience depends upon the convergence of two factors. First, 
it depends on the strength of the initial memory of the stimulus (i.e., the perpetrator). 
Second, it depends on the similarity between the stimulus presented during the 
recognition experience (e.g., the suspect’s photograph in the lineup) and the stimulus as 
presented during the memorial event (in this case the perpetrator’s face). Thus, although 
ecphoric experience can be manipulated in various ways, the simplest manipulation 
involves presenting witnesses with either a target-present (strong ecphoric experience) or 
a target-absent (weak ecphoric experience) lineup (e.g., see Charman & Wells, 2012). 
This manipulation is effective because it alters the level of similarity between the 
witness’s memory of the perpetrator and the perpetrator’s appearance by either including 
(strong ecphoric experience) or not including (weak ecphoric experience) the perpetrator 
in the lineup. According to the CCC, non-memorial cues will have a greater effect on 
eyewitness choosing behavior among witnesses who have a weak ecphoric experience 
(i.e., from target-absent lineups) rather than a strong ecphoric experience (i.e., from 
target-present lineups). Therefore, I hypothesized that the presence of a non-memorial 
cue will increase choosing rates of the cued member, and will do so more when witnesses 
have a weak ecphoric experience than a strong ecphoric experience (Hypothesis 1). 
Recall that the CCC predicts that the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing 
behavior will occur via leading witnesses to deliberatively infer who the suspect is 
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whereas the WITNESS model predicts that non-memorial cues will lead a witness to re-
assess the match values of the various lineup members, thus potentially changing who 
appears most similar to the witness’s memory of the perpetrator. To tease apart these two 
explanations I collected similarity data of the various lineup members. It was predicted, 
consistent with CCC predictions, that the perceived similarity between the suspect’s 
lineup photograph and the witness’s memory of the perpetrator would not mediate the 
effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications (Hypothesis 2). 
Additionally, according to the CCC, regardless of the strength of their ecphoric 
experience witnesses will engage in some level of inferential processing because the 
importance of the decision and the lack of time constraints allows witnesses motivation 
and time to engage in these processes. Thus, I predicted that corroborating cues (i.e., 
when a deliberative cue suggests the identified lineup member) should increase 
confidence whereas competing cues (i.e., when a deliberative cue suggests someone other 
than the identified lineup member) should reduce confidence, and this effect will be 
greater among witnesses who have a weak ecphoric experience rather than witnesses who 
have a strong ecphoric condition (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, if inferential processing is 
engaged in regardless of the strength of the ecphoric experience, then even when 
witnesses have a strong ecphoric experience, decision time should be longer for those in 
the cued conditions compared to the no-cue condition (Hypothesis 4).  
Method 
Participants and Design. Three hundred seventy six undergraduate students 
(64.1% female; 62.7% Hispanic; Mage = 21, SD = 3.33) from a large southeastern 
university participated in exchange for extra credit in their psychology courses. This 
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research was fully approved to meet all ethical standards of treatment by an IRB. 
Participants were assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 (lineup type: target-present, 
target-absent) x 3 (non-memorial cue: cue-target, cue-filler, no-cue) between-subjects 
design. Lineup type refers to the presence (target-present) or absence (target-absent) of 
the perpetrator. We chose to use the circle as the non-memorial cue in the present study 
because, unlike the mug-shot like background cue, the circle cue does not alter the actual 
photographs in the lineup. Thus, any effect the circle had on choosing behavior would be 
difficult to account for with an increase in familiarity explanation. Non-memorial cue 
refers to the placement of the cue (or lack thereof) within the lineup. In the cue-target 
condition, participants viewed a lineup in which a co-witness had ostensibly identified 
the perpetrator’s photograph (target-present lineups) or the innocent suspect’s photograph 
(target-absent lineups) by circling that lineup member’s number. In the cue-filler 
condition, participants viewed a lineup in which a co-witness had ostensibly identified 
one of the fillers in the lineup by circling that lineup member’s number (the cue will be 
rotated amongst the two best alternative fillers). Lastly, in the no-cue condition, 
participants viewed a lineup without a non-memorial cue present.  
Materials 
Mock crime video. The mock-crime video portrayed a young Hispanic male 
stealing money from a purse on a table outside of a University building. The video was 
53s in length with the perpetrator’s face in view for 13s. All witnesses viewed the same 
video together on a computer screen. 
Lineup construction. Fillers were chosen from a digital database of student 
identification photographs. Fillers were chosen based on their match to the perpetrator on 
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various characteristics (gender, age, skin tone, hair color and length, and facial hair). Six 
fillers were chosen based on the aforementioned characteristics. Target-absent lineups 
were composed of these six fillers whereas target-present lineups were constructed by 
replacing filler #2 with the target. Thus, filler #2 served as our a priori innocent suspect in 
target-absent lineups. Research using this identical lineup indicated that the target-present 
lineup had an effective size of 4.0 (Charman & Cahill, 2012).  
The non-memorial cue manipulation consisted of providing the participants in the 
cued conditions with ostensible co-witness information in the form of a circle on one of 
the lineup member’s number, thus allowing a witness to infer that another witness had 
identified the cued member as the thief from the video. Several deceptive steps, described 
in detail below in the procedure section, were taken to ensure the participants believed 
that the circle was made by a fellow witness and not the researcher. There were four 
lineup variations for each lineup type (i.e., present, absent): one lineup with an “erased” 
circle on the target (or innocent suspect) photo’s number (cue-target condition), two 
lineups with the “erased” circle rotated between the two best alternative fillers’ numbers 
(cue-filler condition), and one lineup with no cue present (no-cue condition). 
Furthermore, the position of the target (or innocent suspect) was rotated between position 
two and five. Thus, in total there were 16 lineup variations. Lineup members were shown 
simultaneously on a sheet of paper in full color in a 3 x 2 array consisting of head-and-
shoulder views, wearing everyday clothing in a full-frontal view.  
Procedure  
Upon arrival participants in groups of 2 or 3 (with 70.2% of participants being in 
groups of 3), viewed a short video on a computer monitor. Upon completion of the video 
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participants were told the man in the video was stealing money from a purse and they 
were now witnesses to the crime. Furthermore, they were told the purpose of the 
experiment was to examine the consistency of co-witnesses’ memory by having them 
answer the same questions about the crime they just witnessed. 
Next, they were told they would all be shown the same lineup and asked to 
identify the thief from the video. During these instructions the researcher showed the 
participants the back of the purportedly only lineup which had a solid green paper taped 
to the back. In reality all lineups had this same solid green paper taped to the back. This 
was done to further support the deception that all witnesses would be viewing the same 
lineup. They were then told they would work on an anagram task separately for several 
minutes until the researcher was ready to test them. But before separating them they were 
instructed to draw a number from a hat which would indicate the order in which they 
would make their lineup decisions; in reality all the numbers were a “3”, thus making 
them believe they would be the last witness to view the lineup. To ensure the deception 
they were told not to reveal their number to each other.  
Once separated the researcher entered each room and asked them which number 
they drew. After the participants worked on the anagram task for 5-min, the researcher 
assigned participants randomly to one of the conditions and then chose randomly the 
order the participants were tested. Upon entering the room, the researcher thanked them 
for their patience while they tested the other participants first; again this was to reinforce 
the deception. The researcher was holding up a clipboard with the lineup on the bottom 
such that the back of the lineup, with the solid green paper on the back, was in clear view 
of the participant while they provided lineup instructions. The researcher provided the 
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instructions for the lineup task including unbiased lineup instructions (e.g., the 
perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup and a “not there” response is acceptable; 
Malpass & Devine, 1981). Furthermore, to ensure that participants were sufficiently 
motivated to take the lineup task seriously they were told that if they made the correct 
lineup decision they would receive an extra point of course credit. (In reality, regardless 
of the accuracy of their decision they received the extra point of credit.) Before the 
researcher showed the participant the lineup they glanced at the lineup and ostensibly 
noticed something wrong with the lineup. They apologized to the participant and picked 
up an eraser from the desk and proceeded to erase something on the lineup. Importantly, 
the participant did not see what the researcher was erasing and in fact the researcher 
actually was not erasing anything. Again, this was done to reinforce the deception that the 
circle in the lineup was from a fellow co-witness and not the researcher. Lastly, the 
participant was shown one of the aforementioned lineups and their identification and 
decision time (measured using a digital stopwatch) was assessed. Immediately following 
their identification participants provided a confidence judgment. Specifically, they were 
asked, On a scale from 0 (Not Confident at all) to 100 (Completely Confident) how 
confident are you in your lineup decision?  
Next, participants completed a memory questionnaire that assessed the remaining 
dependent measures. The order of the questionnaire was as follows. First, participants 
viewed the lineup presented to them previously and, for each lineup member, indicated 
how “physically similar” the lineup member was to their memory of the thief from the 
video on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all similar) to 10 (Very Similar). 
Next, participants completed a series of open-ended questions assessing the processes 
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underlying their lineup identification decisions, their perceived impact of the non-
memorial cues on their decision making, and their motivations underlying their 
identification decision (e.g., Please describe why you made your lineup decision. That is, 
why did you choose X lineup member or why did you choose the “not there option”). See 
Appendix for a complete list of questions.  
Next, participants completed questions assessing the automaticity/deliberativeness 
of their identification experience, as well as whether they engaged in absolute or relative 
judgment strategies, via their endorsement of various statements that described processes 
in which they may have engaged. Participants were allowed to endorse having used as 
few or as many of these processes as they wished to describe how they reached an 
identification decision. Participants then completed questions assessing their self-reported 
viewing conditions (e.g., “How clear is the image you have in your memory of the target 
photo? “). See Appendix for a complete list of questions. Lastly, participants completed a 
demographic questionnaire (e.g., age, gender, etc.). 
Results 
Manipulation Check. Prior to examining the main hypotheses we first needed to 
examine the effectiveness of the ecphoric experience manipulation. Several lines of 
evidence, detailed below, were used to independently examine the effectiveness of the 
ecphoric experience manipulation.  
Similarity ratings. The extent to which a witness had a strong ecphoric 
experience depends upon the quality of memory and the level of similarity between the 
witness’s memory of the perpetrator and the perpetrator’s lineup photograph. Thus, 
manipulating lineup type (target-present vs target-absent) should have led to changes in 
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the level of ecphoric similarity reported by witnesses. To more precisely assess the effect 
of lineup type on ecphoric similarity only witnesses in the control group (i.e., those who 
did not receive a non-memorial cue) were included in this analysis. In support, witnesses 
in the target-present condition rated the suspect’s photograph as significantly more 
similar (M = 7.24, SD = 2.52) compared to witnesses in the target-absent condition (M = 
3.34, SD = 2.57), t(122) = 8.51, p < .001, η2 = .37.   
Postdictor variables. Research consistently shows that witnesses who make 
accurate identifications tend to make quicker decisions, report having had an automatic 
recognition experience, and have a higher level of confidence-all indicative of a strong 
automatic experience (Charman & Cahill, 2012; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Shaw, 1996). 
Given the assumption that the postdictors are effective because they reflect the strength 
of the ecphoric experience a witness had, differences in these postdictors across lineup 
type would be indicative of a successful manipulation of ecphoric experience. Of note, 
only witnesses that made an identification were included in these analyses because 
postdictors have only been found to postdict accuracy in choosers. First, witnesses in the 
target-present condition had a marginally significantly higher level of confidence (M = 
70.79, SD = 18.66) compared to witnesses in the target-absent condition (M = 66.58, SD 
= 20.75), t(271) = 1.75, p = .08, η2 = .01. Second, witnesses in the target-present 
condition took significantly less time to make a decision (Ms = 19.22, SD = 13.95) 
compared to witnesses in the target-absent condition (Ms = 25.14, SD = 17.79), t(271) = -
-3.08, p = .002, η2 = .03. Third, witnesses in the target-present condition reported a higher 
level of automaticity (M = 0.65, SD = 0.74) compared to witnesses in the target-absent 
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condition (M = 0.42, SD = 0.65), t(271) = 2.67, p = .008, η2 = .03. As expected, the 
aforementioned analyses indicated the manipulation of automaticity was successful. 
Choosing Behavior  
One of the main predictions of the CCC was that the presence of a non-memorial 
cue would increase choosing rates of the cued member, and would do so more when 
witnesses have a weak ecphoric experience (Hypothesis 1). Because the hypothesis 
specifically predicts that the presence of a non-memorial cue will lead to an increase in 
choosing rates of the cued lineup member, separate analyses were conducted for suspect 
identifications and filler identifications. Thus, multiple binary hierarchical-logistic 
regression analyses were conducted examining the effect of the non-memorial cue and 
lineup type on the various identification choices (i.e., suspect and filler identifications). 
Suspect identifications. To examine the effect of the non-memorial cue for those 
in the cue-target condition I regressed the likelihood of making a suspect identification 
(i.e., chose the target from the target-present lineup or chose the innocent suspect from 
the target-absent lineup) on non-memorial cue (cue-target, no-cue) and lineup type 
(target-present, target-absent).  
Results indicated the main effect of non-memorial cue on suspect identifications 
was not significant, Wald(1) = 0.11, p = .74, OR = 0.92. However, witnesses were more 
likely to identify the suspect in the target-present condition (65.6%) compared to the 
target-absent condition (17.2%), Wald(1) = 52.16, p < .001, OR = 9.22. More 
importantly, results indicated the inclusion of the interaction term significantly improved 
model fit, χ2(1, N = 244) = 12.54, p < .001. The model correctly classified 74.2% of 
witnesses’ into suspect identifiers (or not) and accounted for a large amount of variance 
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(Nagelkerke R = .35). Individually, the model indicated the interaction term accounted 
for a unique amount of variance, Wald(1) = 10.90, p = .001, OR = 10.31. For those in the 
target-absent condition, simple main effects indicated witnesses were significantly more 
likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target condition (26.6%) compared to the no-cue 
condition (6.9%), Wald(1) = 7.21, p = .007, OR = 4.88. In contrast, for witnesses in the 
target-present condition, simple main effects indicated witnesses were significantly less 
likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target condition (56.4%) compared to the no-cue 
condition (73.1%), Wald(1) = 3.71, p = .05, OR = 0.47. See Table 1 for probability and 
odds of suspect identification by condition. 
Clearly, the presence of a non-memorial cue affected choosing behavior and was 
moderated by the ecphoric experience. Consistent with predictions the presence of a non-
memorial cue increased suspect identifications in target-absent lineups. However, 
unexpectedly the presence of a cue decreased suspect identifications in target-present 
lineups. I will return to this point later. An important question is how is the non-memorial 
cue affecting suspect identifications among witnesses? There are two possible 
explanations.  
Redistribution of identifications. The first explanation is that the non-memorial 
cue led witnesses who would have made a filler identification to identify the suspect. In 
other words, the non-memorial cue redistributed the identifications of witnesses who 
were already inclined to choose. To examine this explanation I regressed the likelihood of 
making a suspect identification (i.e., chose the target from the target-present lineup or 
chose the innocent suspect from the target-absent lineup) on non-memorial cue (cue-
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target, no-cue) and lineup type (target-present, target-absent), but only included witnesses 
who made a lineup identification (i.e., choosers only).     
Results indicated the main effect of non-memorial cue on suspect identifications 
was not significant, Wald(1) = 0.11, p = .74, OR = 0.91. However, witnesses were more 
likely to identify the suspect in the target-present condition (76.9%) compared to the 
target-absent condition (28.8%), Wald(1) = 36.63, p < .001, OR = 8.65. More 
importantly, results indicated the inclusion of the interaction term significantly improved 
model fit, χ2(1, N = 177) = 8.33, p < .001. The model correctly classified 74.6% of 
witnesses’ suspect identifications and accounted for a large amount of variance 
(Nagelkerke R = .33). Individually, the model indicated the interaction term accounted 
for a unique amount of variance, Wald(1) = 7.62, p = .006, OR = 8.55. For those in the 
target-absent condition, simple main effects indicated choosers were significantly more 
likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target condition (40.5%) compared to the no-cue 
condition (12.9%), Wald(1) = 6.02, p = .01, OR = 4.60. In contrast, for witnesses in the 
target-present condition, simple main effects indicated witnesses were equally likely to 
identify the suspect in the cue-target condition (70.5%) compared to the no-cue condition 
(81.7%), Wald(1) = 1.77, p = .18, OR = 0.54. See Table 1 for probability and odds of 
suspect identification by condition. Thus, the non-memorial cue changed the distribution 
of choices in target-absent but not target-present lineups. 
Increase in choosing rates. The second explanation is that the non-memorial cue 
leads witnesses who would not have made an identification to now identify the suspect. 
To examine this explanation I regressed the likelihood of making an identification 
 42 
(choice) on non-memorial cue (cue-target, no-cue) and lineup type (target-present, target-
absent).     
Results indicated there was a significant main effect of lineup type on choice, 
such that witnesses were significantly more likely to make an identification in the target-
present condition (85.3%) compared to the target-absent condition (59.8%), Wald(1) = 
18.54, p < .001, OR = 3.90. The effect of cue on choice was not significant, Wald(1) = 
0.01, p = .93, OR = 0.97. See Table 2 for probability and odds of making an identification 
by condition. Furthermore, results indicated the inclusion of the interaction term 
significantly improved model fit, χ2(1, N = 244) = 4.01, p = .05. The model correctly 
classified 72.5% of participants’ choice decisions and accounted for a large amount of 
variance (Nagelkerke R = .14). Individually, the model indicated the interaction term 
significantly accounted for a unique amount of variance, Wald(1) = 3.92, p = .05, OR = 
3.56. For witnesses in the target-present condition, simple main effects indicated 
witnesses were equally likely to make a choice in the cue-target condition (80.0%) 
compared to the no-cue condition (89.6%), Wald(1) = 2.13, p = .15, OR = 0.47. 
Similarly, for witnesses in the target-absent condition, simple main effects indicated 
witnesses were equally likely to make a choice in the cue-target condition (65.6%) 
compared to the no-cue condition (53.5%), Wald(1) = 1.87, p = .17, OR = 1.66.  
The above analyses indicated that the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect 
identifications was the result of the non-memorial cue redistributing the identifications of 
choosers, rather than leading non-choosers to identify the suspect.  
Filler identifications. Because I hypothesized the non-memorial cue should lead 
to an increase of the cued lineup member and I counterbalanced the cue among two fillers 
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(filler 1 or filler 6), two separate analyses were needed to examine the effect of the non-
memorial cue on filler identifications. That is, when filler 1 was cued I regressed filler 1 
identifications (i.e., chose filler 1) on non-memorial cue (cue-filler, no-cue) and lineup 
type (target-present, target-absent) and when filler 6 was cued we regressed filler 6 
identifications (i.e., chose filler 6) on non-memorial cue (cue-filler, no-cue) and lineup 
type (target-present, target-absent).  
 Filler 1 identifications. Results indicated the main effect of non-memorial cue on 
filler 1 identifications was not significant, Wald(1) = 0.53, p = .47, OR = 1.43. However, 
witnesses were more likely to identify filler 1 in the target-absent condition (17.4%) 
compared to the target-present condition (3.0%), Wald(1) = 8.56, p = .003, OR = 6.67. 
The interaction term could not be computed because no witnesses in the cue-filler/target-
present condition selected filler 1 (see Table 3 for probabilities) which makes logistic 
regression problematic when you have categorical predictors with limited cases in each 
category (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). To examine the effect of the non-memorial cue on 
filler 1 identifications I conducted a chi-square analysis for only those witnesses in the 
target-absent condition, where enough cases were present in each category. Results 
indicated witnesses in the cue-filler condition (23.5%) and the no-cue condition (13.8%) 
were equally likely to identify filler 1, χ2(1, N = 92) = 1.41, p = .23, ϕ2 = .01. 
 Filler 6 identifications. Results indicated the main effect of non-memorial cue on 
filler 6 identifications was not significant, Wald(1) = 0.21, p = .65, OR = 1.29. However, 
witnesses were more likely to identify filler 6 in the target-absent condition (15.5%) 
compared to the target-present condition (1.9%), Wald(1) = 8.73, p = .003, OR = 9.90. 
Again, the interaction term could not be computed because of limited cases in the cue-
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filler/no-cue target-present conditions (see Table 3 for probabilities). To examine the 
effect of the non-memorial cue on filler 6 identifications I conducted a chi-square 
analysis for only those witnesses in the target-absent condition, where enough cases were 
present in each category. Results indicated witnesses in the cue-filler condition (19.2%) 
and the no-cue condition (13.8%) were equally likely to identify filler 6, χ2(1, N = 84) = 
0.41, p = .52, ϕ2 = .005. Although the data do not show a significant effect of the non-
memorial cue on filler identifications, the direction of the effects are in the predicted 
direction and sample size is certainly limiting the power of these analyses. 
In sum, the choosing behavior data indicated that the non-memorial cue affected 
suspect identifications and that the effect seems to be the result of the non-memorial cue 
altering the distribution of choices as opposed to increasing choosing overall. Recall, the 
criterion shift explanation would predict the presence of a non-memorial cue would affect 
choosing behavior by lowering a witness’s decision criterion. However, the 
aforementioned data is inconsistent with this prediction for two reasons. First, if the 
effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications was the result of lowering a 
witness’s decision criterion then the presence of the cue should have led to increased 
suspect identifications across both lineup types (i.e., target-present and target-absent). 
Second, altering a witness’s decision criterion will either increase (when it is lowered) or 
decrease (when it is raised) choosing rates, but importantly, it will not alter the 
distribution of lineup choices. That is, the lineup member who is the best match to the 
witness’s memory will always be picked at the highest rate regardless of a witness’s 
decision criterion.  
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Similarity Ratings 
Recall, that the CCC predicts the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing 
behavior will occur via leading witnesses to deliberatively infer who the suspect is 
whereas the WITNESS model predicts that non-memorial cues will lead a witness to 
reassess the match values of the various lineup members, thus potentially changing who 
appears most similar to the witness’s memory of the perpetrator. Consistent with CCC 
predictions, I hypothesized the perceived similarity between the suspect’s lineup 
photograph and the witness’s memory of the perpetrator would not mediate the effect of 
the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications (Hypothesis 2). 
To examine whether perceived similarity between the suspect’s lineup photograph 
and the witness’s memory of the perpetrator mediated the effect of the non-memorial cue 
on suspect identifications I used a robust modeling tool called PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). 
Process uses the bootstrapping method (1,000 bootstrap samples in the current analysis) 
to generate bias-corrected confidence intervals for testing the indirect effects (i.e., the 
effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications through perceived suspect 
similarity). Of note, because earlier analyses showed that the effect of the non-memorial 
cue on suspect identifications was moderated by lineup type I conducted a mediation for 
each lineup type. Thus, the models consisted of the predictor variable X (non-memorial 
cue: cue-target, no-cue), the mediator variable M (perceived similarity of the suspect), 
and the outcome variable Y (suspect identification: yes, no) for both target-present and 
target-absent lineups, separately.  
Target-present mediation model. Results indicated (N = 121) the total effect of 
the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications was marginally significant, b = -0.72, SE 
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= .39, p = .06 (see Figure 1). Of note, current thinking about mediation does not require a 
statistically significant total effect for mediation to be present (Hayes, 2013). Thus, 
witnesses were less likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target condition compared to 
the no-cue condition. The direct effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect 
identifications, while controlling for the perceived similarity of the suspect, was not 
statistically significant, b = -0.79, SE = .59, p = .17. Furthermore, the indirect effect of 
the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications through the perceived similarity of the 
suspect was not statistically different from zero as evidenced by a 95% bias-corrected 
bootstrap confidence interval (bootLLCI = -1.58 to bootULCI = 0.29), b = -0.60, SE = 
.49. Consistent with predictions, the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect 
identifications was not mediated by the perceived similarity of the suspect; witnesses in 
the cue-target condition did not perceive a significantly different level of similarity 
between the suspect and the perpetrator than witnesses in the no-cue condition, b = -0.69, 
SE = .51, p = .17. In sum, the current pattern of data support the predictions of the 
WITNESS model and not the CCC.  
Target-absent mediation model. Results indicated (N = 122) the total effect of 
the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications was statistically significant, b = 1.59, SE 
= .59, p = .007. Thus, witnesses were more likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target 
condition compared to the no-cue condition. The direct effect of the non-memorial cue on 
suspect identifications, while controlling for the perceived similarity of the suspect, was 
statistically significant, b = 1.38, SE = .67, p = .04. Furthermore, the indirect effect of the 
non-memorial cue on suspect identifications through the perceived similarity of the 
suspect was statistically different from zero as evidenced by a 95% bias-corrected 
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bootstrap confidence interval (bootLLCI = 0.05 to bootULCI = 1.41), b = 0.62, SE = .35. 
Again consistent with predictions, the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect 
identifications was only partially mediated by the perceived similarity of the suspect. 
Specifically, witnesses in the cue-target condition perceived the suspect as more similar 
to their memory of the perpetrator, which in turn influenced suspect identifications. 
Witnesses who rated the suspect as more similar to their memory of the perpetrator were 
more likely to identify the suspect. However, because this was only a partial mediation, 
this suggests that the cue’s effect on suspect identifications was also being driven by an 
inferential process. In sum, the current pattern of data support the predictions of both the 
CCC and the WITNESS model. 
Confidence 
The CCC makes specific predictions regarding the effect of the non-memorial cue 
on witness confidence levels. Recall that when the non-memorial cue corroborates the 
witness’s identification decision (i.e., when their identification was of a cued lineup 
member) this should increase confidence, whereas when the non-memorial cue competes 
with the witness’s identification decision (i.e., when their identification was of a non-
cued lineup member) this should decrease confidence. Both of these effects should be 
greater in the weak ecphoric experience condition than the strong ecphoric experience 
condition (Hypothesis 3).  
To examine this prediction I conducted a one-way between-subjects ANOVA. To 
establish whether the non-memorial cue was corroborating (cue-target) or competing 
(cue-filler) with witnesses’ identification decision only suspect identifiers were included 
in this analysis. Also, because so few witnesses identified the suspect in the cue-
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filler/target-absent (n = 3) and no-cue/target-absent (n = 4) conditions only witnesses in 
the target-present condition were included in this analysis. Thus, I examined the effect of 
a corroborating and competing cue by examining the effect of the non-memorial cue 
(cue-target, cue-filler, no-cue) on confidence, including only target-present suspect 
identifiers in the analysis. 
Results indicated there was a significant effect of non-memorial cue on 
confidence, F(2, 122) = 3.84, p = .02, η2 = .06. Tukey HSD tests indicated mean 
confidence in a suspect identification was significantly greater for witnesses in the cue-
target condition (M = 77.90, SD = 15.96) versus witnesses in the cue-filler condition (M = 
67.40, SD = 16.80), p = .03. However, all other comparisons were non-significant (see 
Table 4 for descriptive statistics), although the means were trending in the predicted 
direction. One possible factor contributing to the non-significance of these results is the 
significant amount of variation within each group. Also, remember the CCC predicts the 
effect of the non-memorial cue on confidence would be stronger in the weak ecphoric 
experience condition (target-absent) rather than the strong ecphoric experience condition 
(target-present). Thus, only being able to assess these effects in the strong ecphoric 
experience condition (because of sample size issues in target-absent lineups), makes it 
more difficult to reveal any effects. Regardless, these results support the CCC’s 
predictions regarding the corroborating/competing nature of the non-memorial cue on 
confidence reports.   
Decision Time 
The CCC predicts that even when witnesses have a strong ecphoric experience, 
witnesses will still engage is some level of inferential processes (Hypothesis 4). Thus, it 
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was predicted that the presence of a non-memorial cue would significantly increase 
decision time but that this effect would be greater in the target-absent condition than the 
target-present condition. Because this prediction does not specify differential effects for 
the non-memorial cue conditions (i.e., cue-target, cue-filler) on decision time, I collapsed 
across the two cued conditions to make a combined cue condition (i.e., cue-target and 
cue-filler were combined into one condition). To test this prediction I conducted a 2 
(lineup type: target-present, target-absent) x 2 (non-memorial cue: cue-present, no-cue) 
between-subjects factorial ANOVA.  
To correct for non-normality decision time was transformed using a logarithm 
function. Also, I removed several significant outliers (i.e., cases that were more than three 
standard deviations from the mean). In total four cases were removed: one from the 
target-present/cue-present condition, two from the target-present/no-cue condition, and 
one from the target-absent/no-cue condition.  
Results indicated the mean decision time was significantly greater for witnesses in 
the cue-present condition (Ms = 24.28, SD = 17.55) versus witnesses in the no-cue 
condition (M = 20.68, SD = 17.75), F(1, 368) = 4.59, p = .03, ηp2 = .01. The mean 
decision time was significantly lower for witnesses in the target-present (Ms = 19.48, SD 
= 14.53) versus witnesses in the target-absent condition (Ms = 26.91, SD = 19.81), F(1, 
368) = 16.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .04. Last, the interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 
368) = 0.16, p = .69, ηp2 < .001. See Table 5 for descriptive statistics for each condition. 
In sum, these results provide partial support for my hypothesis. The presence of a cue did 
increase decision time, however, the effect was not moderated by lineup type.   
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IV. DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of this study was to test whether witness choosing behavior is 
driven simply by memorial factors or by a combination of both memorial factors and 
non-memorial inferential processes. I also examined whether the effect of non-memorial 
cues on choosing behavior would be dependent upon the strength of the witnesses’ 
ecphoric experience. Data across two studies indicated that witness choosing behavior 
was driven not only by memorial factors, but also by non-memorial factors as well, and 
importantly, that the effect of non-memorial factors was moderated by the strength of 
witnesses’ ecphoric experience. Study 1 showed that mock-witnesses, who have no actual 
memory of the perpetrator, engaged in an inferential process by using the presence of a 
non-memorial cue in the lineup to help guide their choosing behavior. However, the fact 
that these mock-witnesses, by definition, do not actually have a memory of the 
perpetrator prevents any conclusions from being drawn about how real witnesses’ 
choosing behavior will be affected by such non-memorial cues. The findings from study 
2 provided a stronger test of how real witnesses’ choosing behavior is affected by non-
memorial cues.  
Choosing Behavior 
The presence of the non-memorial cue on the target significantly increased 
suspect identifications compared to its absence, but only when the witness had a weak 
ecphoric experience (i.e., target-absent condition). In fact, the odds of identifying the 
suspect were nearly five times greater when the non-memorial cue was on the target 
compared to when it was not on the target. Interestingly, when the witness had a strong 
ecphoric experience (i.e., target-present condition) the presence of the non-memorial cue 
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on the target significantly decreased suspect identifications compared when there was no 
non-memorial cue present. The odds of identifying the target were about half as great 
when the non-memorial cue was on the target compared to when it was not on the target. 
Consistent with predictions, these effects indicate the effect of the non-memorial cue on 
choosing behavior was greater when the witness had a weak ecphoric experience 
compared to a strong ecphoric experience. 
Whereas the non-memorial cue and lineup type combined to affect suspect 
identifications, the non-memorial cue, either alone or in combination with lineup type, 
did not affect filler identifications. One possible explanation for this null effect is that 
witnesses were less likely to report noticing the cue when it was on a filler (46%) versus 
when it was on the target (71%). Obviously for the non-memorial cue to be effective it 
must be noticed by witnesses; had more witnesses noticed the cue on the filler, I may 
have observed a significant effect on filler identifications.  
Nonetheless, the effect of a non-memorial cue on suspect identifications was 
greater when witnesses had a weak ecphoric experience. An important questions remains: 
Which theoretical explanation(s) (i.e., criterion shift, reassessment of match values, or 
inferential-based) can best account for the current data?  
Theoretical Frameworks 
Clearly the data in the present study indicated witnesses’ choosing behavior was 
driven by both memorial (e.g., strength of the witnesses’ ecphoric experience) and 
inferential (e.g., the presence of the non-memorial cue) processes. Three theoretical 
explanations have been proposed to account for eyewitness choosing behavior. Because 
each explanation predicts that the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing behavior will 
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result in a specific pattern of choosing behavior, direct comparisons among the 
explanations can be made to assess which theoretical perspective can best account for the 
data. 
Criterion shift. The first explanation attempts to account for non-memorial 
processes via a change in a witness’s decision criterion. For instance, the aforementioned 
cognitive models (i.e., dual-process recognition models and SDT) and the WITNESS 
model predict that the presence of a non-memorial cue would lead witnesses to lower 
their decision criterion compared when there is no non-memorial cue, resulting in an 
increase in choosing rates overall. And since the target should tend to be the best match 
to a witness’s memory, then a lowered decision criterion would result in an increase in 
target identifications in particular. This is because a downward criterion shift would lead 
low confidence witnesses to choose more often but it would not alter which lineup 
member they would choose. Three specific patterns of data exist within the current study 
that are inconsistent with a criterion shift explanation. 
First, the presence of a non-memorial cue on the target resulted in opposite effects 
on suspect identifications across lineup type. Specifically, a non-memorial on the target 
decreased suspect identifications from target-present lineups but increased suspect 
identifications from target-absent lineups. This pattern is inconsistent with a criterion 
shift because lowering a witness’s criterion will lead to increased choosing in both target-
present and target-absent lineups. And because the target will tend to be the best 
memorial match this will result in an increase in suspect identifications in both lineup 
types.    
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Second, if the presence of a non-memorial cue affected suspect identifications via 
a criterion shift then they would have changed choosing rates. Inconsistent with this 
explanation results indicated the presence of a non-memorial cue on the target did not 
affect choosing rates compared to its absence for either witnesses who viewed a target-
absent or target-present lineup.  
Third, the findings indicated that the non-memorial cue changed the distribution 
of responses: Witnesses who would have identified a filler instead identified the target 
when the target was cued. In other words, the cue changed the distribution of 
identifications among choosers. This is inconsistent with a criterion shift explanation: A 
criterion shift can explain a change in the proportion of witnesses who make an 
identification, but cannot account for a change in who witnesses identify. 
Reassessment of match values. The second theoretical framework predicts that 
the presence of a non-memorial cue will lead witnesses to reassess the importance of 
certain matching and mismatching facial features leading witnesses to alter which lineup 
member is the best match to their memory of the perpetrator (Clark et al., 2009). In other 
words, this prediction can account for data showing an increase in suspect identifications 
from target-absent lineups as well as a concomitant decrease in suspect identifications 
from target-present lineups. For example, it could be that in target-absent lineups the non-
memorial cue on the target led witnesses to reassess the match values, increasing the 
perceived match of the target and their memory of the perpetrator, and resulting in 
increased choosing of the suspect. In contrast, it could be that in target-present lineups the 
non-memorial cue on the target led witnesses to reassess the match values, decreasing the 
perceived match of the target and their memory of the perpetrator, and resulting in 
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decreased choosing of the suspect. This framework thus appears consistent with the 
choosing data. Importantly, for this prediction to be supported by the data witnesses’ 
perceived similarity of the suspect must at a minimum partially mediate the effect of the 
non-memorial cue on suspect identifications. Mediation analyses provided partial support 
for this framework. Specifically, suspect similarity did not mediate the effect of the non-
memorial cue on suspect identifications for witnesses in the target-present condition but 
did partially mediate the effect in target-absent lineups. Thus, although it appears the 
effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications may be partly the result of a re-
assessment of match values, at least for target-absent lineups, this framework cannot fully 
explain the current pattern of data.  
Inferential based framework. According to the CCC, witness choosing behavior 
will be driven by both memorial and non-memorial factors, with the effect of non-
memorial cues being moderated by the ecphoric experience of the witness. Importantly, 
unlike the re-assessment of match values framework, the CCC predicts that the effect of a 
non-memorial cue will be partly driven by an inferential process. That is, the non-
memorial cue will not only affect choosing behavior by altering a witness’s perceived 
similarity between a lineup member and their memory of the perpetrator, but will also do 
so via an inferential deliberative process. For example, a witness may infer that the 
circled lineup member is likely the perpetrator because one of the other witnesses already 
identified him.  
Mediation analyses indicated that the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect 
identifications in target-absent lineups was only partly accounted for by similarity ratings 
and the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications in target-absent lineups 
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was not mediated by similarity ratings. This suggests that the non-memorial cue is 
affecting choosing behavior through some other process besides a reassessment of match 
values. The pattern of data in both target-present and target-absent lineups can be 
explained via the inferential based explanation proposed by the CCC, which explains the 
observed data in the following way.  
First, witnesses in the target-absent condition tended to have a weak ecphoric 
experience which led them to engage in inferential processing to aid their decision-
making. This would have led them to notice that one of the lineup members was circled, 
which may result in a reassessment of the similarity between the cued lineup member and 
their memory of the perpetrator. However, the re-weighting of certain features may not 
always provide enough of a change in similarity to provide enough basis to identify this 
individual. Witnesses may also have then searched for non-memorial cues to help them 
determine the identity of the suspect in the lineup. They may have reasoned that because 
lineup member two was circled, that another witness identified that lineup member, and 
therefore inferred that he must be the perpetrator.  
Second, witnesses in the target-present condition tended to have a strong ecphoric 
experience which led them to engage in less inferential processing to aid their decision-
making. This would have led them to notice that one of the lineup members was circled, 
which may result in a reassessment of the similarity between the cued lineup member and 
their memory of the perpetrator. But because these witnesses tended to have a strong 
ecphoric experience the presence of a non-memorial cue on the target would not likely 
alter similarity ratings. At this point, the CCC would predict witnesses searched for other 
non-memorial reasons to aid in their decision making. Again, I found evidence for this. 
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Witnesses who had a strong ecphoric experience reasoned that because lineup member 
two was circled this must be a trick and thus were less likely to choose. This latter 
finding, although unexpected, is still consistent with the inferential based framework. 
One possible explanation is that witnesses in the target-present condition, who are more 
likely to have a strong ecphoric experience, could be experiencing a form of 
psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966). Psychological reactance theory states that when 
an individual’s freedom is threatened they will react by rebelling against that threat. 
Applied to these data, when the target is in the lineup witnesses have a strong ecphoric 
experience and want to choose the target. However, the presence of a non-memorial cue 
on the target may lead some witnesses to infer that their freedom to choose who they 
want is being threatened and thus experience reactance thereby resisting the perceived 
influence of the non-memorial cue, and as a result, choose to identify another lineup 
member. If true, this is consistent with the idea that witnesses engaged in an inference-
based process: a cue may have led them to infer that the cued suspect could not be the 
target. 
Decision time and confidence. Aside from the choosing behavior data, the 
predictions regarding the effect of the non-memorial cue on both decision time and 
witness confidence made by the CCC were generally supported. First, when a non-
memorial cue was present witnesses took significantly more time to make a decision 
compared to when there was no cue. Second, when witnesses identified the suspect they 
reported a significantly higher level of confidence when the non-memorial cue was on the 
target compared to when the non-memorial cue was on a filer. These findings both 
provide further support for the inferential based framework proposed by the CCC.  
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Clearly, the decision criterion shift explanation is unable to account for the data. 
The re-assessment of match values explanation was able to account for some of the data, 
but the CCC appears to provide the best fit for the data. Of note, the CCC and the 
WITNESS model are not necessarily exclusive, and can in fact be reconciled. For 
example, because the WITNESS model is a mathematical model it is relatively simple to 
incorporate the role that inferential based processing has on choosing behavior by adding 
a parameter to account for it within the model (although it currently has yet to do so). 
However, some important differences exist that I argue should lead researchers to prefer 
the CCC model.  
First, the CCC offers a more general framework for researchers to work with 
because it makes the same predictions as the WITNESS model when there are no non-
memorial cues to drive inferential processing. Note that the WITNESS model was 
derived mostly by data obtained from studies in which the researchers deliberately 
avoided adding any non-memorial cues in the lineups as to the identity of the suspect. 
The WITNESS model is able to account for these data fairly well; however, I argue that 
when non-memorial cues do exist, the CCC does a better job accounting for their effects. 
Second, compared to the WITNESS model, the CCC provides more specific explanations 
for the effect of manipulations on other witness-related variables (e.g., confidence, 
decision time, etc.). Although the WITNESS model can be extended to account for these 
outcomes variables, it currently focuses primarily on choosing behavior, in contrast to the 
CCC, which accounts for both choosing and confidence. Third, the WITNESS model 
cannot fully account for the current data. For example, the WITNESS model predicts the 
effect of non-memorial cues on choosing behavior occurs via a re-assessment of match 
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values. However, the effect of the cue in target-present data was not explained via a re-
assessment of match values. It appears that the effect of the cue, at least in target-present 
lineups, was the result of a purely inferential process. Fourth, the CCC is able to account 
for choosing behavior of both actual witnesses and mock-witnesses whereas the 
WITNESS model cannot account for mock-witness choosing behavior because it relies 
on match values. 
A good scientific theory needs to not only make novel predictions and drive 
future research but it must also account for existent data and the CCC is able to do so. 
First, clothing bias (i.e., when only one of the lineup members is dressed similarly to how 
the perpetrator was at the time of the crime) has been demonstrated to increase false 
identifications without affecting correct identifications (Lindsay, Wallbridge, & Drennan, 
1987). According to the CCC, witnesses in the target-present condition will not be 
affected by the clothing bias because they have a strong ecphoric experience, resulting in 
less reliance on inferential processing. However, those in the target-absent lineup should 
have a relatively weak ecphoric experience and should therefore search for non-memorial 
information, using an inferential process to aid their decision-making. Thus, according to 
the CCC the negative effect that clothing bias has on false identifications is the result of 
an inferential process. Accordingly, the CCC would predict that preventing witnesses’ 
ability to engage in an inferential process should mitigate the negative effect of clothing 
bias. Indeed, Lindsay et al. (1991) found that using the sequential lineup procedure 
mitigated the effect clothing bias was having on false identifications. The CCC can 
account for this: When the pictures were presented all at once (i.e., using the 
simultaneous procedure) witnesses could use their inferential processing within this 
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context to compare the pictures with each other and infer that the lineup member who is 
dressed in the same clothing must be the perpetrator. In contrast, when the lineup 
procedure removed this context by presenting the pictures individually (i.e., using the 
sequential procedure) this reduced witnesses’ ability to use a deliberative process to infer 
on the basis of the clothing bias who the suspect was.  
Second, witness are more likely to choose from a lineup when the administrator 
was not blind compared to when they were blind (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Phillips, 
McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999). Also, witnesses – especially those with weaker 
memories – appear to look for indications from the lineup administrator as to the identity 
of the suspect in the lineup when they are motivated to make an identification 
(Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). These results are consistent with the inferential-based 
framework in that witnesses in the target-present condition will not be strongly affected 
by the administrators influence because they have a strong ecphoric experience, resulting 
in less reliance on inferential processing. However, witnesses who view a target-absent 
lineup should have a relatively weak ecphoric experience and should therefore search for 
non-memorial information, using an inferential process to aid their decision-making. 
Thus, according to the CCC the double-blind procedure mitigates the negative effects of 
administrator influence. 
Third, a recent finding showed evidence of a novel postdictor of eyewitness 
accuracy. Charman and Cahill (2012) reasoned that witnesses who view a target-present 
lineup will be more likely to have a strong ecphoric experience which tends to be 
associated with accurate identifications. However, witnesses who view a target-absent 
lineup will be more likely to have a weak ecphoric experience which tends to be 
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associated with inaccurate identifications. As a consequence of the strength of the 
ecphoric experience, witnesses will differ in their memory of the fillers in the lineup: 
Witnesses who have a strong ecphoric experience will not need to engage in inferential 
processing (i.e., they won’t spend much time looking at the fillers) whereas witnesses 
who have a weak ecphoric experience will engage in inferential processing (i.e., they will 
spend time looking at the fillers). Thus, the extent to which witnesses engage in 
inferential processing will lead to detectable differences in their memory of the fillers in 
the lineup, with greater memory for fillers indicative of more inferential processing. 
Indeed, results indicated witnesses’ memory for fillers significantly postdicted 
identification accuracy: The more fillers remembered, the more likely the witness was to 
have made a false identification. These results are consistent with the inferential-based 
framework and show independent evidence that the level of inferential processing 
engaged by witnesses is dependent upon their ecphoric experience.    
Practical Implications 
These data provide important implications for gathering eyewitness data in the 
real world. First, data suggest that non-memorial cues provide no benefit to the reliability 
of eyewitness identifications. Of the non-memorial cues examined in the literature (e.g., 
clothing bias, administrative influence, co-witness information, lineup bias, etc.), all lead 
to an increase in false identifications without affecting correct identifications. Indeed, the 
non-memorial cue in the current studies increased false identifications while 
simultaneously decreasing correct identifications. This consistent pattern of data shows 
that the presence of a non-memorial cue is actually counterproductive to the purpose of a 
lineup. In a real investigation the purpose of a lineup is to provide probative value 
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regarding the guilt of the suspect in the lineup (Charman & Wells, 2007a). This can be 
accomplished by calculating a diagnosticity ratio, which is the proportion of correct 
identifications divided by the proportion of false identifications (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). 
Therefore, by increasing false identifications without increasing correct identifications (or 
even decreasing correct identifications, as in Study 2), the presence of non-memorial cues 
tend to reduce the diagnosticity of lineups (and hence the probative value of an 
identification). Indeed, the diagnosticity ratio was lower when the non-memorial cue was 
on the target (2.12) than when there was no non-memorial cue (11.03). As a result police 
should strive to remove as many non-memorial influences as possible as they offer no 
benefit. For example, the non-memorial cue used in the present study is essentially co-
witness information. In real life there are often multiple witnesses to a crime and 
therefore it would behoove officers to prevent witnesses from communicating with each 
other, particularly about their lineup identification decision.   
Second, consistent with the CCC, the current data indicate that non-memorial 
cues have a greater effect when a witness has a weak ecphoric experience. Because a 
witness’s ecphoric experience is driven by both their memory strength and the match 
between the lineup members and their memory of the perpetrator, research studies may 
be showing a greater effect of non-memorial cues on choosing than would be shown 
among real-world witnesses. For instance, in almost all eyewitness studies, all witnesses, 
regardless of their reported quality of memory, are shown a lineup and asked to make an 
identification. In contrast, in real life cases, particularly ones with multiple witnesses, 
police officers will often only show lineups to witnesses that self-report having had a 
high quality memory of the perpetrator. All other factors being equal, empirical findings 
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of various non-memorial cues will likely reveal a greater effect because real life 
witnesses who will tend to have a weaker ecphoric experience are never shown a lineup. 
Thus, the effects we show in the laboratory may in fact be overestimating the impact of 
non-memorial factors on eyewitness accuracy.  
Relatedly, the method used by both researchers and expert witnesses to measure 
the effect non-memorial cues have on witness choosing behavior – the mock-witness 
paradigm – may tend to overestimate bias. Mock-witnesses by definition have no 
memory of the perpetrator; thus, they must use a purely inferential process to make an 
identification decision. As a result, mock witness paradigms should show a strong effect 
of non-memorial cues on identification rates, producing large estimates of bias. However, 
this paradigm may be overestimating the influence any given non-memorial cue is having 
on witness choosing behavior: Since real world witnesses have a memory of a 
perpetrator, they should tend to experience some degree of an ecphoric experience when 
viewing a lineup (particularly a target-present lineup), making them less susceptible to 
the effect of non-memorial cues.  
Third, the framework of the CCC does offer at least one simple safeguard for 
police officers to help mitigate the effect of non-memorial cues. When constructing a 
lineup they should ensure that they include a current photograph of the suspect. Again, a 
witness’s ecphoric experience is driven by both their memory strength and the ecphoric 
match between the lineup members and their memory of the perpetrator. While 
investigators have no control over the memorial experience of their witnesses they can 
increase the chances that a witness will have a strong ecphoric experience by using 
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current photographs in the lineup; this in turn should make witnesses less susceptible to 
non-memorial cues in the lineup, thus increasing their accuracy overall.  
Limitations 
There are at two important limitations of the present work. First, to examine 
CCC’s prediction of the non-memorial cue on confidence, we had to examine only 
witnesses who made a suspect identification. But this is a self-selected variable; in other 
words, we did not force witnesses to choose. As a consequence, because the rates of 
choosing the suspect differed across cue conditions (i.e., the cue-target condition resulted 
in more suspect identifications than the no-cue condition), we lose random assignment to 
condition. As a result, causal conclusions are impossible to draw as to the effect of a 
competing or corroborating cue on confidence in an identification. Future research could 
attempt to control for suspect identification. For example, Wells, Bradfield, and Olson 
(2002) successfully manipulated witness accuracy by (a) forcing all witnesses to choose, 
and (b) including a highly similar innocent suspect in target-absent lineups. As a 
consequence, the vast majority of witness identified the target. A similar procedure may 
be useful in testing the CCC’s predictions regarding competing and corroborating cues on 
witness confidence. 
Second, the use of only one type of non-memorial cue limits the generalizability 
of these data. It is unknown whether the observed patterns of data will occur across the 
myriad possible non-memorial cues. Indeed, data from Study 1 indicated that only certain 
non-memorial cues affected choosing behavior. Why did some of the cues affect 
choosing behavior while others did not? Future research should address this question. 
One possible explanation is that a non-memorial cue will only affect choosing behavior 
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insofar that the inferential process indicates to the witness that the cue possesses 
diagnostic information. Study 1 provided preliminary support for this explanation. For 
example, contrast the circle non-memorial cue (which showed an effect on choosing) 
with the tilted non-memorial cue (which did not show an effect on choosing). It is easier 
to see that a person might assume that the reason why a lineup member is circled is 
because someone else believes that is the perpetrator. However, a picture being tilted at 
an angle in a lineup may be less likely to convey any diagnostic information as to the 
identity of the suspect. Future research should examine witnesses’ attributions for the 
reasons why cues are present in the lineup, and whether those attributions moderate the 
effect of cues on choosing behavior. 
Future Directions 
The ultimate goal of eyewitness researchers is to develop procedures that help to 
increase correct identifications and reduce false identifications. It is clear that few 
procedures within the literature have had much success in increasing hits, whereas the 
majority of procedures that have been recommended have been beneficial at reducing 
false identifications. This is likely because it is difficult to develop a procedure that 
fosters a stronger ecphoric experience because witnesses’ ecphoric experience is 
dependent largely upon their quality of memory, which cannot be controlled by the legal 
system. However, there may exist ways to increase ecphoric experience. For example, 
using clear photographs in a lineup that accurately depict the appearance of the 
perpetrator at the time of the crime and reducing the retention interval between the crime 
and the lineup task should both help a witness have a relatively strong ecphoric 
experience if shown a target-present lineup. Thus, future research should investigate 
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these and other possible ways to increase the level of ecphoric experience a witness may 
have.  
According to the inferential-based framework, many of the various manipulations 
in the literature that increase false identifications do so because witnesses engage in 
inferential processing, particularly when they have a weak ecphoric experience. Thus, 
procedures and/or instructions that discourage witnesses from engaging in inferential 
processing would be extremely impactful. Perhaps an additional lineup instruction 
instructing witnesses to avoid inferential processing could prevent this detrimental 
deliberative processing, and thus improve the diagnosticity of lineup identifications. This 
could even be accomplished by modifying the wording of the recommended unbiased 
instructions. For example, the following instruction may help prevent inferential-based 
processing: “Please keep in mind that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the 
lineup. Also, keep in mind your task is to use your memory to make your lineup decision 
not to use other non-memory based factors”. Not only should this instruction reduce the 
likelihood of false identifications itself, but it should also help mitigate the negative 
effects of inferential processing.   
There are likely multiple factors driving a witness to use inferential processing but 
one obvious factor is that of motivation. Witnesses who view a lineup are motivated for 
various reasons (e.g., justice, self-esteem boost, belief in a just world) to make an 
identification from a lineup. The very nature of the task likely implies to witnesses that 
the guilty party is in the lineup and therefore it is their job to simply identify the 
perpetrator. Surprisingly, very little research has investigated the role of motivation in 
witness choosing behavior. And although some manipulations, such as unbiased 
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instructions, are designed to reduce the belief that lineups always contain the actual 
perpetrator, witnesses still tend to make false identifications even when given those 
unbiased instructions, suggesting that they are nonetheless motivated to pick someone 
from the lineup. Thus, future research would be well guided to develop new lineup 
methods that specifically reduce the role motivation plays in witness choosing behavior. 
Indeed, it is possible, and consistent with the CCC, that motivation plays a crucial causal 
role in the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing behavior. Specifically, witnesses 
who have a weak ecphoric experience may be more likely to engage in inferential 
processing only if they are motivated to make an identification; thus, motivated witnesses 
who experience a weak ecphoric experience are the witnesses who will be affected most 
by non-memorial cues. A witness who has a weak ecphoric experience but is not highly 
motivated may not engage in inferential processing and may be more likely to (correctly) 
reject the lineup. Future research should examine whether the effect of non-memorial 
cues on identification accuracy is moderated by a witness’s motivation to make an 
identification.  
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Footnote 
 1 This description of a sequential lineup procedure omits several other defining 
features, for a more complete description of the lineup procedure see Lindsay & Wells 
(1985).  
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Table 1 
Probability and Odds of Identifying the Suspect by Non-memorial Cue and Lineup Type 
Note. Within each row, probabilities with different superscripts differ at p ≤ .05 
  
 All Witnesses 
  Cue Target No Cue 
Probability    
 Target Present .563a (n = 55) .761b (n = 67) 
 Target Absent .265a (n = 64) .069b (n = 58) 
Odds    
 Target Present 1.292 2.722 
 Target Absent 0.3617 0.074 
 Choosers 
  Cue Target No Cue 
Probability    
 Target Present .705a (n = 44) .817a (n = 60) 
 Target Absent .405a (n = 42) .129b (n = 31) 
Odds    
 Target Present 2.384 4.456 
 Target Absent 0.680 0.148 
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Table 2 
Probability and Odds of Making an Identification by Non-memorial Cue and Lineup 
Type 
Note. Within each row, probabilities with different superscripts differ at p < .05 
 
  
  Cue Target No Cue 
Probability    
 Target Present .80a (n = 55) .896a (n = 67) 
 Target Absent .656a (n = 64) .535a (n = 58) 
Odds    
 Target Present 4.00 8.569 
 Target Absent 1.909 1.148 
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Table 3 
Probability and Odds of Identifying the Cued Filler by Non-memorial Cue and Lineup 
Type 
 
  
 Filler 1 Identifications 
  Cue Filler 1 No Cue 
Probability    
 Target Present .000 (n = 32) .045 (n = 67) 
 Target Absent .235 (n = 34) .138 (n = 58) 
Odds    
 Target Present 0.00 0.047 
 Target Absent 0.308 0.16 
 Filler 6 Identifications 
  Cue Filler 6 No Cue 
Probability    
 Target Present .025 (n = 40) .015 (n = 67) 
 Target Absent .192 (n = 26) .138 (n = 58) 
Odds    
 Target Present 0.026 0.015 
 Target Absent 0.238 0.16 
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Table 4 
Means (SDs) of Witness Confidence Reports by Non-memorial Cue 
Note.  Means with different superscripts differ at p < .05 
 
  
  
 Cue Target 
(n = 31) 
Cue Filler 
(n = 45) 
No Cue 
(n = 49) 
    
 77.90a (15.96) 67.40b (16.80) 73.71ab (17.11) 
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Table 5 
Means (SDs) of Witness Decision Time by Non-memorial Cue and Lineup Type 
   
  Combined Cue No Cue 
 Target Present 
 
20.65 (14.74) 
n = 126 
 
17.22 (13.96) 
n = 65 
 
Target Absent 
27.97 (19.38) 
n = 124 
24.62 (20.70) 
n = 57 
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a) Direct Pathway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Mediated Pathway 
 
Figure 1. Target-present mediation model with predictor variable non-memorial cue (cue-target, no-cue), the mediator variable 
perceived similarity of the suspect, and the outcome variable suspect identification (yes, no). Panel a represents the total effect of 
non-memorial cue on suspect identification. Panel b represents the direct and indirect effects of non-memorial cue on suspect 
identification. *p < .05 
 
Perceived Similarity of 
the Suspect 
Non-Memorial 
Cue 
Suspect 
Identification 
b = -0.69 b = 0.86* 
b = -0.79 
Non-Memorial 
Cue 
Suspect 
Identification 
b = -0.72 
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a) Direct Pathway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Mediated Pathway 
 
Figure 1. Target-absent mediation model with predictor variable non-memorial cue (cue-target, no-cue), the mediator variable 
perceived similarity of the suspect, and the outcome variable suspect identification (yes, no). Panel a represents the total effect of 
non-memorial cue on suspect identification. Panel b represents the direct and indirect effects of non-memorial cue on suspect 
identification. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Perceived Similarity of 
the Suspect 
Non-Memorial 
Cue 
Suspect 
Identification 
b = 1.11* b = 0.56*** 
b = 1.38* 
Non-Memorial 
Cue 
Suspect 
Identification 
b = 1.59** 
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VI. APPENDIX  
Memory Questionnaire 
RKG Judgments 
Thinking back to your lineup identification decision. Please use the following 
descriptions to indicate which option best reflects your experience in making your lineup 
identification. Please carefully read each description before making your decision.  
Remember: If you became consciously aware again of some aspect or aspects of what 
happened or what was experienced at the time you viewed the video (e.g., aspects of the 
physical appearance of the individual in the video, or of something that happened in the 
room, or of what one was thinking or doing at that time). An example of a Remember 
judgment would be when you recognize someone, and you remember talking to them at 
the party you attended the previous weekend. 
Know: If you recognized the thief from the video but you cannot recollect consciously 
anything about its actual occurrence or what happened or what was experienced at the 
time you viewed the video. An example of a Know judgment would be when you are 
confident you recognize someone, because of strong feelings of familiarity, but you have 
no recollection of seeing this person before. You cannot remember anything about them. 
Guess: If your lineup identification was NOT accompanied by a conscious recollection of 
its prior occurrence when you viewed the video NOR was it accompanied by any feelings 
of familiarity. That is, your lineup identification was made based on an educated Guess.  
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Open-ended Assessments of Decision Processes 
Please describe why you made your lineup decision. That is, why did you choose X 
lineup member or why did you choose the “not there option”. 
Was there anything about the lineup that lead to your lineup decision other than your 
memory of the target photo? If so, please explain. 
Did one of the photos in the lineup “stand out” from the other photos in the lineup? If so, 
please explain. 
If you noticed that one of the photos in the lineup “stood out” from the other 
photos in the lineup do you think this influenced your decision? If so, please 
explain. 
Did you notice that one of the photos in the lineup was circled?  
If so, do you think this influenced your lineup decision? Please explain. 
While viewing the lineup did you feel motivated to make an identification? If so, please 
explain. 
 
Imagine you witnessed a crime and the police ask you to view a lineup to see if you can 
identify the perpetrator. Before viewing the lineup would you assume the actual 
perpetrator is in the lineup? 
If so, please explain why you think this and how you think this might affect your 
lineup decision making.   
Imagine you witnessed a crime and the police ask you to view a lineup to see if you can 
identify the perpetrator and while you are looking at the lineup you fail to recognize any 
of the lineup members. Would you then look for any clues either in the lineup or 
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provided by the detective to help you figure out who the perpetrator is? If so, please 
explain. 
Endorsements of Decision Process 
There are a number of different strategies witnesses may use when trying to make a 
lineup identification. Some of these are listed below. You may have used all, some, or 
none of these strategies. Please indicate which of the following strategies you used when 
making your identification decision by placing an ‘X’ beside any of the strategies that 
you used.  
  ______ I compared facial features of each of the photos to my memory of the thief 
______  His face just popped out at me 
______ I first eliminated the ones definitely not him  
______  I thought about reasons why the lineup members might be the thief 
______ I just recognized him, I cannot explain why    
______  I compared the photos to each other 
______  I looked for a lineup member that matched my memory of the thief 
______ I had to think to figure out my decision  
_______ I picked the person who I reasoned the researchers wanted me to pick 
The photos that you saw in the lineup may have had an impact on your decision in 
various ways. Some of these ways are listed below. Please indicate which of the 
following statements describes how the photos influenced your decision by placing an 
‘X’ beside the statements that describes the photos’ influence. (You may indicate all, 
some, or none of these statements). 
______ They helped me to confirm/reinforce my decision after I made it 
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______ They had little influence on my decision 
______ They confused me; they made the task more difficult 
______ They were all so similar that they made me less confident 
Which of the following had a greater impact on your decision? 
______ The photos in the lineup 
______ My memory 
Self-reported Viewing Conditions 
How good of a view did you get of the thief? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very poor                                       Very good 
 
When looking at the thief I actively tried to memorize his face. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                          Strongly Agree 
 
Throughout the event I paid close attention to the thief’s face. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                            Strongly Agree 
 
 
How clear is the image you have in your memory of the thief you saw in the video? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
       Not at all clear                                                  Very clear 
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How distinctive was the thief’s face?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all Distinctive                         Very Distinctive 
 
Throughout the event I paid close attention to the thief’s actions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                          Strongly Agree 
 
 
How far away was the thief in the video? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not far                                                     Very far 
 
During the event I found myself thinking about how the thief reminded me of someone 
else. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          Strongly Disagree                         Strongly Agree 
 
Based on your memory of the thief’s face, how confident are you that you could pick the 
thief out of a crowd of people? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all Confident                           Completely Confident 
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The thief’s face reminded me of someone I know. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                      Strongly Agree 
 
During the event I made judgments about the thief because based on his facial 
characteristics. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                             Strongly Agree 
 
During the crime I found it difficult to pay attention to details. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                       Strongly Agree 
 
Generally, how good is your recognition memory for the faces of strangers? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
         Very poor                                                Excellent 
 
How well were you able to make out specific features of the thief’s face from the video? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Not at all                                     Very well 
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For how long would you estimate thief’s face was in view? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very little time                        Quite a bit of time 
 
I did not get a clear view of the thief’s face. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                                            Strongly Agree 
 
During the event I found myself trying to understand why the thief was committing the 
crime. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                               Strongly Agree 
 
To what extent do you feel that you have a good basis (enough information) to recognize 
the thief from a photograph? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     No basis at all                                         A very good basis 
 
I am much better at remembering faces than I am at remembering names. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                                    Strongly Agree 
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Throughout the event I found myself getting distracted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly Disagree                         Strongly Agree 
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